Otto Liljalaakso writes:

Kevin Fenzi kirjoitti 2.11.2022 klo 20.33:
So, I suppose the web interface could offer signed copies if they exist,
but might be confusing if you don't know what the various keys short
hash is. Feel free to file a RFE for koji folks: https://pagure.io/koji

I personally will not, because I have been happily downloading the unsigned builds from Koji for testing, thus I cannot really present the case. But perhaps somebody who would prefer, or insists on, using only signed builds wants to?

Given the package URLs are https:// URLs to the fedoraproject.org domain, their downloads are effectively signed by fedoraproject.org's SSL certificate, which is comparably cryptographically strong as PGP-signed RPMs.

Without having any direct knowledge of the process that PGP-signs the built RPMs, I suppose that it's theoretically possible for fedoraproject.org's web server to be compromised, which would allow for distribution of compromised RPMs, without compromising the PGP-signing infrastructure. But, in exceptional situations like the current one, everyone can weigh all the risk factors and make an intelligent decision by themselves.

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