On Tue, Jun 2, 2020 at 8:42 PM John M. Harris Jr <joh...@splentity.com> wrote:

> In what way is it incompatible with UEFI Secure Boot?

Secure Boot does boot verification. Hibernation right now doesn't. And
that makes it a Secure Boot loophole. And that makes it incompatible
with Secure Boot.

It's not a new idea, it's been this way for a while. And so have the complaints.
https://lwn.net/Articles/523367/

<If the kernel and
> initramfs are signed, and the resume image is for that kernel, how is this an
> issue?

The initramfs is not signed.

> What if swap is on LUKS?

No signature. No integrity. It is a net reduction in the protection
provided by Secure Boot - e.g. it can't detect intentional corruption
that could crash the system or even cause more corruption and eventual
data loss as the system runs.

> If kernel lockdown is what disables this, we should look at fixing kernel
> lockdown so that it doesn't break hibernation. This is definitely a security
> decision that we shouldn't be imposing on the masses needlessly, in my
> opinion.

Instead you propose imposing a loophole for attackers to easily deploy
malware needlessly. Do you really not see how this is an untenable
position for Fedora?



-- 
Chris Murphy
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