On Thursday, December 5, 2019 5:35:09 AM MST Lennart Poettering wrote: > On Do, 05.12.19 04:30, John M. Harris Jr (joh...@splentity.com) wrote: > > Well, you are, in that the average attacker have to break or steal a key > > to decrypt the drive first. Sure, it wouldn't stop a sophisticated > > attack. > > > Not how this works.
It is. If you cannot decrypt it, you cannot modify it, nor even read it. > > This is not generally true either. Encrypting /boot helps to ensure that > > /boot is not modified, and is generally paired with GRUB signature > > validation. In some setups, this GRUB configuration is moved to flash > > storage. > > > You are conflating integrity and confidentiality. If you want to > protect boot loaders against modification you want the former, not > necessarily the latter. I am not conflating the two, though confidentiality inherently provides a certain degree of integrity. If you want to protect boot loaders against modification, you want *both*. -- John M. Harris, Jr. Splentity _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to devel-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/project/code-of-conduct/ List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
