On 2019-04-03, Dominik 'Rathann' Mierzejewski <domi...@greysector.net> wrote: > On Wednesday, 03 April 2019 at 21:30, Chris Murphy wrote: >> On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 2:58 AM Dominik 'Rathann' Mierzejewski >> <domi...@greysector.net> wrote: >> > >> > On Thursday, 28 March 2019 at 17:30, Ben Cotton wrote: >> > > On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 4:12 PM Ben Cotton <bcot...@redhat.com> wrote: >> > > > >> > > > https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Include_security_modules_in_efi_Grub2 >> > > > >> > > This Change proposal is on hold. >> > >> > Too bad. As a long-time SecureBoot user, I was looking forward to being >> > able to have encrypted /boot on Fedora. >> >> I'm not sure if this has anything to do with why it's on hold, but >> GRUB does not support LUKS2. And there are no TPM bindings supported >> in LUKS1, but are in LUKS2. In order to get to full disk encryption >> out of the box by default with automatic unlock (measured boot to >> obtain the cryptographic key from the TPM), needs LUKS2. So in effect >> that means we either need GRUB to support LUKS2, or settle on an >> unencrypted /boot. > > Well, why can't we have LUKS1-encrypted /boot and enter the encryption > password by hand? That's still better than unencrypted /boot. > What's the point of encrypting /boot? All the executed bits from /boot (grub, kernel, and initramdisk) are measured by TPM. Thus if somebody tampers them, root file system decryption that uses TPM will fail.
-- Petr _______________________________________________ devel mailing list -- devel@lists.fedoraproject.org To unsubscribe send an email to devel-le...@lists.fedoraproject.org Fedora Code of Conduct: https://getfedora.org/code-of-conduct.html List Guidelines: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Mailing_list_guidelines List Archives: https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/devel@lists.fedoraproject.org
