For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. This follows UEFI Spec.
But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for the callers in EmbeddedPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of the image. Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindh...@linaro.org> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheu...@linaro.org> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <phi...@redhat.com> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992 Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan...@intel.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheu...@linaro.org> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <phi...@redhat.com> --- .../AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c | 9 +++++++++ .../Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c index 591afbe7cc..fe05878b4b 100644 --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Application/AndroidFastboot/Arm/BootAndroidBootImg.c @@ -71,10 +71,19 @@ StartEfiApplication ( // Load the image from the device path with Boot Services function Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, ParentImageHandle, DevicePath, NULL, 0, &ImageHandle); if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } return Status; } // Passed LoadOptions to the EFI Application if (LoadOptionsSize != 0) { diff --git a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c index d9e7aa7d2b..e1036954ee 100644 --- a/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c +++ b/EmbeddedPkg/Library/AndroidBootImgLib/AndroidBootImgLib.c @@ -439,10 +439,22 @@ AndroidBootImgBoot ( + KernelSize; Status = gBS->LoadImage (TRUE, gImageHandle, (EFI_DEVICE_PATH *)&KernelDevicePath, (VOID*)(UINTN)Kernel, KernelSize, &ImageHandle); + if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { + // + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now. + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak. + // + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) { + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle); + } + return Status; + } // Set kernel arguments Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **) &ImageInfo); ImageInfo->LoadOptions = NewKernelArg; -- 2.18.0.windows.1 -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. View/Reply Online (#47944): https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/message/47944 Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/34275941/21656 Group Owner: devel+ow...@edk2.groups.io Unsubscribe: https://edk2.groups.io/g/devel/unsub [arch...@mail-archive.com] -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
