On 9/18/19 5:05 AM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
>
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
>
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the
> execution of the image.
>
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray...@intel.com>
> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao....@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <ler...@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan...@intel.com>
> Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao....@intel.com>
> ---
> ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c | 9 +++++++++
> .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> index 6909f29441..4d5a5668aa 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> @@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile(
> goto Done;
> }
> DevPath =
> ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol->GetDevicePathFromFilePath(CmdFilePathName);
> Status = gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0,
> &CmdFileImgHandle);
> if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource
> leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle);
> + }
OK
> *HelpText = NULL;
> goto Done;
> }
> Status = gBS->OpenProtocol(
> CmdFileImgHandle,
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> index 1b169d0d3c..5b6cba17f3 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
> /** @file
> Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function.
>
> (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
> - Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> + Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> #include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h"
> @@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage (
> ImageBuffer,
> ImageLength,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution
> of an image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
OK
> ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN
> (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom", FileName,
> ImageIndex);
> // PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR),
> HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status);
> } else {
> Status = gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL);
> if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> index 6a94b48c86..b6e7c952fa 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
> /** @file
> Main file for attrib shell level 2 function.
>
> (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
> - Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> #include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h"
> @@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver(
> NULL,
> 0,
> &LoadedDriverHandle);
>
> if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle);
> + }
OK.
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <phi...@redhat.com>
> ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE),
> gShellLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status);
> } else {
> //
> // Make sure it is a driver image
> //
>
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