Branko Čibej wrote on Tue, Mar 27, 2012 at 03:05:12 +0200: > On 26.03.2012 17:45, Greg Hudson wrote: > > On 03/26/2012 09:00 AM, C. Michael Pilato wrote: > >> The on-disk cache will contain everything it does today where > >> plaintext caching is enabled, save that the password won't be > >> plaintext, and there will be a bit of known encrypted text (for > >> passphrase validation). > > Is it important to be able to locally validate the passphrase? That > > property intrinsically enables offline dictionary attacks. > > I was going to say the same. When I read "known encrypted text" my hair > stood on end. :) > > You don't need passphrase validation. If the passphase is wrong, then > the recovered password will be wrong, too. It is bad practice to tell > people that they used the wrong passphrase, and it's even better if you > don't even know that it's wrong. >
Though it'll probably be possible to tell that the recovered thing isn't a password --- for example, if it contains a NUL character, then it isn't a password. > -- Brane >
