On Thu, Apr 4, 2013 at 12:23 PM, Dennis E. Hamilton <dennis.hamil...@acm.org > wrote:
> In previous generations of this kind of discussion, the ASF old-hands will > point out that the social process works quite well, folks don't do commits > unless they feel qualified to do so, and it is often the case that > committers will request RTC (i.e., submit patches rather than update the > SVN) in contributing where they are not experienced or don't consider > themselves expert. > > At the ASF this appears to be one of those, "if it is not broken, don't > fix it." > > If it is visibly and publicly broken then it is too late to do anything about it. I'd like to think that there is room within the Apache Way for prevention, foresight and reasonable precaution. > There is still the concern about stolen credentials used to perform > undetected malicious acts. If the oversight that the project naturally > brings to bear on visible changes to the code base is insufficient, I think > the problem is greater than there being a possible exploit of that > inattention. Mechanical solutions may be part of the disease, not the cure > [;<). > The project does bear responsibility to review changes. But we also bear responsibility for having reasonable access controls. It is hard to argue that giving authorization for code changes to someone who showed a pulse in July 2011 but has never been heard of since is a reasonable policy. -Rob > > - Dennis > > -----Original Message----- > From: Andrea Pescetti [mailto:pesce...@apache.org] > Sent: Thursday, April 04, 2013 08:57 > To: dev@openoffice.apache.org > Subject: Re: Proposal: Improve security by limiting committer access in SVN > > Dave Fisher wrote: > > Let's focus only on adding one new authz list for the code tree. > > Call it openoffice-coders and populate it with those who HAVE any > > commit activity in the current code tree. > > I checked feasibility with Infra. Summary: > > 1) LDAP is not the solution. Rule it out. > > 2) The only possible solution would be an authz rule like suggested by > Dave here; however, Infra quite discourages it, mainly for maintenance > reasons. This leads me to think we would need some good justifications > for implementing this. > > 3) If the justification is security, then there are other privileges to > monitor. Namely, every committer has shell access to people.apache.org, > authenticated access to the Apache SMTP server and CMS privileges for > the openoffice.org website, including publish operations. > > For the record, the Subversion project has complex rules like Rob > pointed out; but it's only a "social enforcement", i.e., all committers > respect those limitations by their own choice; if you look at the > technical level, every committer (all Apache committers) can commit code > to the Subversion subtree. > > Regards, > Andrea. > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@openoffice.apache.org > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@openoffice.apache.org > > > --------------------------------------------------------------------- > To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@openoffice.apache.org > For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@openoffice.apache.org > >
