Hi Konstantin, Thanks for the response. Related new feature introduction in case of Basic auth I tend to agree, anything else can be chosen.
However representing Kerberos as completely new feature is not true because it's already in since Flink makes authentication at least with HDFS and Hbase through Kerberos. The main problem with the actual Kerberos implementation is that it contains several bugs and only partially implemented. Following your suggestion can we agree that we skip the Basic auth implementation and finish an already started Kerberos story by adding History Server and Job Dashboard authentication? Adding OIDC or OAuth2 has the exact same concerns what you've guys just raised. Why exactly these? If you think this would be beneficial we can discuss it in detail but as a side story it would be good to finish a halfway done Kerberos story. Related authorization you've mentioned it can be complicated over time. Can you show us an example? We've knowledge with couple of open source components but authorization was never a horror complex story. I personally have the most experience with Spark which I think is quite simple and stable. Users can be viewers/admins and jobs started by others can't be modified. If you can share an example over-complication we can discuss on facts. Thank you in advance! BR, G On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 5:42 PM Konstantin Knauf <kna...@apache.org> wrote: > Hi everyone, > > sorry for joining late and thanks for the insightful discussion. > > In general, I'd personally prefer not to increase the surface area of > Apache Flink unless there is a good reason. It seems we all agree that > authx is not part of the core value proposition of Apache Flink, so if we > can delegate this problem to a more specialized tool, I am in favor of > that. Apache Flink is already huge and a lot of work goes into maintenance, > so I personally have become more sensitive to this aspect over time. > > If we add support for Basic Auth and Kerberos now, users will sooner or > later ask for OIDC, LDAP, SAML,... I acknowledge that Kerberos is widely > used in the corporate, on-premises context, but isn't the focus moving more > towards more web-friendly standards like OIDC/OAuth 2.0? If we only want to > support a single protocol, there is an argument to be made that it should > be OIDC and Dex [1,2] as a bridge to everything else. Have OIDC or OAuth2 > been considered instead of Kerberos? How do you see the market moving? But > as I said before, in my opinion we can generate more value by investing > into other areas of Apache Flink. > > Authorization also has the potential to become more fine-grained and > complex over time: you already mentioned restricting the actions that a > specific user can do in a cluster. > > Cheers, > > Konstantin > > [1] https://github.com/dexidp/dex > [2] https://github.com/dexidp/dex/issues/1903 > > > On Wed, Jun 16, 2021 at 11:44 AM Gabor Somogyi <gabor.g.somo...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> Hi Till, >> >> Did you have the chance to take a look at the doc? Not yet seen any >> update. >> >> BR, >> G >> >> >> On Wed, Jun 9, 2021 at 1:43 PM Till Rohrmann <trohrm...@apache.org> >> wrote: >> >> > Thanks for the update Gabor. I'll take a look and respond in the >> document. >> > >> > Cheers, >> > Till >> > >> > On Wed, Jun 9, 2021 at 12:59 PM Gabor Somogyi < >> gabor.g.somo...@gmail.com> >> > wrote: >> > >> >> Hi Till, >> >> >> >> Your proxy suggestion has been considered in-depth and updated the FLIP >> >> accordingly. >> >> We've considered 2 proxy implementation (Nginx and Squid) but according >> >> to our analysis and testing it's not suitable for the mentioned >> use-cases. >> >> Please take a look at the rejected alternatives for detailed >> explanation. >> >> >> >> Thanks for your time in advance! >> >> >> >> BR, >> >> G >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Jun 4, 2021 at 3:31 PM Till Rohrmann <trohrm...@apache.org> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> >>> As I've said I am not a security expert and that's why I have to ask >> for >> >>> clarification, Gabor. You are saying that if we configure a >> truststore for >> >>> the REST endpoint with a single trusted certificate which has been >> >>> generated by the operator of the Flink cluster, then the attacker can >> >>> generate a new certificate, sign it and then talk to the Flink >> cluster if >> >>> he has access to the node on which the REST endpoint runs? My >> understanding >> >>> was that you need the corresponding private key which in my proposed >> setup >> >>> would be under the control of the operator as well (e.g. stored in a >> >>> keystore on the same machine but guarded by some secret). That way >> (if I am >> >>> not mistaken), only the entity which has access to the keystore is >> able to >> >>> talk to the Flink cluster. >> >>> >> >>> Maybe we are also getting our wires crossed here and are talking about >> >>> different things. >> >>> >> >>> Thanks for listing the pros and cons of Kerberos. Concerning what >> other >> >>> authentication mechanisms are used in the industry, I am not 100% >> sure. >> >>> >> >>> Cheers, >> >>> Till >> >>> >> >>> On Fri, Jun 4, 2021 at 11:09 AM Gabor Somogyi < >> gabor.g.somo...@gmail.com> >> >>> wrote: >> >>> >> >>>> > I did not mean for the user to sign its own certificates but for >> the >> >>>> operator of the cluster. Once the user request hits the proxy, it >> should no >> >>>> longer be under his control. I think I do not fully understand yet >> why this >> >>>> would not work. >> >>>> I said it's not solving the authentication problem over any proxy. >> Even >> >>>> if the operator is signing the certificate one can have access to an >> >>>> internal node. >> >>>> Such case anybody can craft certificates which is accepted by the >> >>>> server. When it's accepted a bad guy can cancel jobs causing huge >> impacts. >> >>>> >> >>>> > Also, I am missing a bit the comparison of Kerberos to other >> >>>> authentication mechanisms and why they were rejected in favour of >> Kerberos. >> >>>> PROS: >> >>>> * Since it's not depending on cloud provider and/or k8s or bare-metal >> >>>> etc. deployment it's the biggest plus >> >>>> * Centralized with tools and no need to write tons of tools around >> >>>> * There are clients/tools on almost all OS-es and several languages >> >>>> * Super huge users are using it for years in production w/o huge >> issues >> >>>> * Provides cross-realm trust possibility amongst other features >> >>>> * Several open source components using it which could increase >> >>>> compatibility >> >>>> >> >>>> CONS: >> >>>> * Not everybody using kerberos >> >>>> * It would increase the code footprint but this is true for many >> >>>> features (as a side note I'm here to maintain it) >> >>>> >> >>>> Feel free to add your points because it only represents a single >> >>>> viewpoint. >> >>>> Also if you have any better option for strong authentication please >> >>>> share it and we can consider the pros/cons here. >> >>>> >> >>>> BR, >> >>>> G >> >>>> >> >>>> >> >>>> On Fri, Jun 4, 2021 at 10:32 AM Till Rohrmann <trohrm...@apache.org> >> >>>> wrote: >> >>>> >> >>>>> I did not mean for the user to sign its own certificates but for the >> >>>>> operator of the cluster. Once the user request hits the proxy, it >> should no >> >>>>> longer be under his control. I think I do not fully understand yet >> why this >> >>>>> would not work. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> What I would like to avoid is to add more complexity into Flink if >> >>>>> there is an easy solution which fulfills the requirements. That's >> why I >> >>>>> would like to exercise thoroughly through the different >> alternatives. Also, >> >>>>> I am missing a bit the comparison of Kerberos to other >> authentication >> >>>>> mechanisms and why they were rejected in favour of Kerberos. >> >>>>> >> >>>>> Cheers, >> >>>>> Till >> >>>>> >> >>>>> On Fri, Jun 4, 2021 at 10:26 AM Gyula Fóra <gyf...@apache.org> >> wrote: >> >>>>> >> >>>>>> Hi! >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> I think there might be possible alternatives but it seems Kerberos >> on >> >>>>>> the rest endpoint ticks all the right boxes and provides a super >> clean and >> >>>>>> simple solution for strong authentication. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> I wouldn’t even consider sidecar proxies etc if we can solve it in >> >>>>>> such a simple way as proposed by G. >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> Cheers >> >>>>>> Gyula >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>> On Fri, 4 Jun 2021 at 10:03, Till Rohrmann <trohrm...@apache.org> >> >>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I am not saying that we shouldn't add a strong authentication >> >>>>>>> mechanism if there are good reasons for it. I primarily would >> like to >> >>>>>>> understand the context a bit better in order to give qualified >> feedback and >> >>>>>>> come to a good decision. In order to do this, I have the feeling >> that we >> >>>>>>> haven't fully considered all available options which are on the >> table, tbh. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Does the problem of certificate expiry also apply for self-signed >> >>>>>>> certificates? If yes, then this should then also be a problem for >> the >> >>>>>>> internal encryption of Flink's communication. If not, then one >> could use >> >>>>>>> self-signed certificates with a longer validity to solve the >> mentioned >> >>>>>>> issue. >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> I think you can set up Flink in such a way that you don't have to >> >>>>>>> handle all the different certificates. For example, you could >> deploy Flink >> >>>>>>> with a "sidecar proxy" which is responsible for the >> authentication using an >> >>>>>>> arbitrary method (e.g. Kerberos) and then bind the REST endpoint >> to a local >> >>>>>>> network interface. That way, the REST endpoint would only be >> available >> >>>>>>> through the sidecar proxy. Additionally, one could enable SSL for >> this >> >>>>>>> communication. Would this be a solution for the problem? >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> Cheers, >> >>>>>>> Till >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 10:46 PM Márton Balassi < >> >>>>>>> balassi.mar...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> That is an interesting idea, Till. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> The main issue with it is that TLS certificates have an >> expiration >> >>>>>>>> time, usually they get approved for a couple years. Forcing our >> users to >> >>>>>>>> restart jobs to reprovision TLS certificates would be weird when >> we could >> >>>>>>>> just implement a single proper strong authentication mechanism >> instead in a >> >>>>>>>> couple hundred lines of code. :-) >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> In many cases it is also impractical to go the TLS mutual route, >> >>>>>>>> because the Flink Dashboard can end up on any node in the >> k8s/Yarn cluster >> >>>>>>>> which means that we need a certificate per node (due to the >> mutual auth), >> >>>>>>>> but if we also want to protect the private key of these from >> users >> >>>>>>>> accidentally or intentionally leaking them then we need this per >> user. As >> >>>>>>>> in we end up managing user*machine number certificates and >> having to renew >> >>>>>>>> them periodically, which albeit automatable is unfortunately not >> yet >> >>>>>>>> automated in all large organizations. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> I fully agree that TLS certificate mutual authentication has its >> >>>>>>>> nice properties, especially at very large (multiple thousand >> node) clusters >> >>>>>>>> - but it has its own challenges too. Thanks for bringing it up. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> Happy to have this added to the rejected alternative list so that >> >>>>>>>> we have the full picture documented. >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 5:52 PM Till Rohrmann < >> trohrm...@apache.org> >> >>>>>>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> I guess the idea would then be to let the proxy do the >> >>>>>>>>> authentication job and only forward the request via an SSL >> mutually >> >>>>>>>>> encrypted connection to the Flink cluster. Would this be >> possible? The >> >>>>>>>>> beauty of this setup is in my opinion that this setup should >> work with all >> >>>>>>>>> kinds of authentication mechanisms. >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> Cheers, >> >>>>>>>>> Till >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 3:12 PM Gabor Somogyi < >> >>>>>>>>> gabor.g.somo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> Thanks for giving options to fulfil the need. >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> Users are looking for a solution where users can be identified >> on >> >>>>>>>>>> the whole cluster and restrict access to resources/actions. >> >>>>>>>>>> A good example for such an action is cancelling other users >> >>>>>>>>>> running jobs. >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> * SSL does provide mutual authentication but when >> authentication >> >>>>>>>>>> passed there is no user based on restrictions can be made. >> >>>>>>>>>> * The less problematic part is that generating/maintaining >> short >> >>>>>>>>>> time valid certificates would be a hard (that's the reason KDC >> like servers >> >>>>>>>>>> exist). >> >>>>>>>>>> Having long time valid certificates would widen the attack >> >>>>>>>>>> surface but since the first concern is there this is just a >> cosmetic issue. >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> All in all using TLS certificates is not sufficient in these >> >>>>>>>>>> environments unfortunately. >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> BR, >> >>>>>>>>>> G >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 12:49 PM Till Rohrmann < >> >>>>>>>>>> trohrm...@apache.org> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> Thanks for the information Gabor. If it is about securing the >> >>>>>>>>>>> communication between the REST client and the REST server, >> then Flink >> >>>>>>>>>>> already supports enabling mutual SSL authentication [1]. >> Would this be >> >>>>>>>>>>> enough to secure the communication and to pass an audit? >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> [1] >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> https://ci.apache.org/projects/flink/flink-docs-master/docs/deployment/security/security-ssl/#external--rest-connectivity >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> Cheers, >> >>>>>>>>>>> Till >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 10:33 AM Gabor Somogyi < >> >>>>>>>>>>> gabor.g.somo...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Hi Till, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Since I'm working in security area 10+ years let me share my >> >>>>>>>>>>>> thought. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> I would like to emphasise there are experts better than me >> but >> >>>>>>>>>>>> I have some >> >>>>>>>>>>>> basics. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> The discussion is open and not trying to tell alone things... >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > I mean if an attacker can get access to one of the >> machines, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> then it >> >>>>>>>>>>>> should also be possible to obtain the right Kerberos token. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Not necessarily. For example if one gets access to a specific >> >>>>>>>>>>>> user's >> >>>>>>>>>>>> credentials then it's not possible to compromise other user's >> >>>>>>>>>>>> jobs, data, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> etc... >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Security is like an onion, the more layers has been added the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> more time an >> >>>>>>>>>>>> attacker needs to proceed. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> At the end of the day if one is in, then most probably can >> find >> >>>>>>>>>>>> the way but >> >>>>>>>>>>>> this time is normally enough to sysadmins or security >> experts to >> >>>>>>>>>>>> close down the system and minimize the damage. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> The other thing is that all tokens has a timeout and if the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> token is >> >>>>>>>>>>>> invalid then the attacker can't proceed further. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > Is Kerberos also the standard authentication protocol for >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kubernetes >> >>>>>>>>>>>> deployments? >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kerberos is an industry standard which is cloud/deployment >> >>>>>>>>>>>> agnostic and it >> >>>>>>>>>>>> can be used in any deployments including k8s. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> The main intention is to use kerberos in k8s deployments too >> >>>>>>>>>>>> since we're >> >>>>>>>>>>>> going this direction as well. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Please see how Spark does this: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> https://spark.apache.org/docs/latest/security.html#secure-interaction-with-kubernetes >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Last but not least the most important reason to add at least >> >>>>>>>>>>>> one strong >> >>>>>>>>>>>> authentication is that we have users who has >> >>>>>>>>>>>> hard requirements on this. They're doing security audits and >> if >> >>>>>>>>>>>> they fail >> >>>>>>>>>>>> then it's deal breaking. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> That is why we have added kerberos at the first place. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Unfortunately we >> >>>>>>>>>>>> can't name them in this public list, however >> >>>>>>>>>>>> the customers who specifically asked for this were mainly in >> >>>>>>>>>>>> the banking >> >>>>>>>>>>>> and telco sector. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> BR, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> G >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> On Thu, Jun 3, 2021 at 9:20 AM Till Rohrmann < >> >>>>>>>>>>>> trohrm...@apache.org> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > Thanks for updating the document Márton. Why is it that >> banks >> >>>>>>>>>>>> will >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > consider it more secure if Flink comes with Kerberos >> >>>>>>>>>>>> authentication >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > (assuming a properly secured setup)? I mean if an attacker >> >>>>>>>>>>>> can get access >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > to one of the machines, then it should also be possible to >> >>>>>>>>>>>> obtain the right >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > Kerberos token. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > I am not an authentication expert and that's why I wanted >> to >> >>>>>>>>>>>> ask what are >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > other authentication protocols other than Kerberos? Why did >> >>>>>>>>>>>> we select >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > Kerberos and not any other authentication protocol? Maybe >> you >> >>>>>>>>>>>> can list the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > pros and cons for the different protocols. Is Kerberos also >> >>>>>>>>>>>> the standard >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > authentication protocol for Kubernetes deployments? If not, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> what would be >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > the answer when deploying on K8s? >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > Cheers, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > Till >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > On Wed, Jun 2, 2021 at 12:07 PM Gabor Somogyi < >> >>>>>>>>>>>> gabor.g.somo...@gmail.com> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> Hi team, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> Happy to be here and hope I can provide quality additions >> in >> >>>>>>>>>>>> the future. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> Thank you all for helpful the suggestions! >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> Considering them the FLIP has been modified and the work >> >>>>>>>>>>>> continues on the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> already existing Jira. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> BR, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> G >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> On Wed, Jun 2, 2021 at 11:23 AM Márton Balassi < >> >>>>>>>>>>>> balassi.mar...@gmail.com> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> Thanks, Chesney - I totally missed that. Answered on the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> ticket too, let >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> us continue there then. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> Till, I agree that we should keep this codepath as slim >> as >> >>>>>>>>>>>> possible. It >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> is an important design decision that we aim to keep the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> list of >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> authentication protocols to a minimum. We believe that >> this >> >>>>>>>>>>>> should not be a >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> primary concern of Flink and a trusted proxy service (for >> >>>>>>>>>>>> example Apache >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> Knox) should be used to enable a multitude of enduser >> >>>>>>>>>>>> authentication >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> mechanisms. The bare minimum of authentication mechanisms >> >>>>>>>>>>>> to support >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> consequently consist of a single strong authentication >> >>>>>>>>>>>> protocol for which >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> Kerberos is the enterprise solution and HTTP Basic >> primary >> >>>>>>>>>>>> for development >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> and light-weight scenarios. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> Added the above wording to G's doc. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NMPeJ9H0G49TGy3AzTVVJVKmYC0okwOtqLTSPnGqzHw/edit >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> On Tue, Jun 1, 2021 at 11:47 AM Chesnay Schepler < >> >>>>>>>>>>>> ches...@apache.org> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> There's a related effort: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/FLINK-21108 >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> On 6/1/2021 10:14 AM, Till Rohrmann wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > Hi Gabor, welcome to the Flink community! >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > Thanks for sharing this proposal with the community >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Márton. In >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> general, I >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > agree that authentication is missing and that this is >> >>>>>>>>>>>> required for >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> using >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > Flink within an enterprise. The thing I am wondering >> is >> >>>>>>>>>>>> whether this >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > feature strictly needs to be implemented inside of >> Flink >> >>>>>>>>>>>> or whether a >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> proxy >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > setup could do the job? Have you considered this >> option? >> >>>>>>>>>>>> If yes, then >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> it >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > would be good to list it under the point of rejected >> >>>>>>>>>>>> alternatives. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > I do see the benefit of implementing this feature >> inside >> >>>>>>>>>>>> of Flink if >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> many >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > users need it. If not, then it might be easier for the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> project to not >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > increase the surface area since it makes the overall >> >>>>>>>>>>>> maintenance >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> harder. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > Cheers, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > Till >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > On Mon, May 31, 2021 at 4:57 PM Márton Balassi < >> >>>>>>>>>>>> mbala...@apache.org> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> wrote: >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> > >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> Hi team, >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> Firstly I would like to introduce Gabor or G [1] for >> >>>>>>>>>>>> short to the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> community, he is a Spark committer who has recently >> >>>>>>>>>>>> transitioned to >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> Flink Engineering team at Cloudera and is looking >> >>>>>>>>>>>> forward to >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> contributing >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> to Apache Flink. Previously G primarily focused on >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Spark Streaming >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> and >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> security. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> Based on requests from our customers G has >> implemented >> >>>>>>>>>>>> Kerberos and >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> HTTP >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> Basic Authentication for the Flink Dashboard and >> >>>>>>>>>>>> HistoryServer. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> Previously >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> lacked an authentication story. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> We are looking to contribute this functionality back >> to >> >>>>>>>>>>>> the >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> community, we >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> believe that given Flink's maturity there should be a >> >>>>>>>>>>>> common code >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> solution >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> for this general pattern. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> We are looking forward to your feedback on G's >> design. >> >>>>>>>>>>>> [2] >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> [1] http://gaborsomogyi.com/ >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> [2] >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1NMPeJ9H0G49TGy3AzTVVJVKmYC0okwOtqLTSPnGqzHw/edit >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>>> >> >>>>>>>>>>> >> > > > -- > > Konstantin Knauf > > https://twitter.com/snntrable > > https://github.com/knaufk >
