From: Srisivasubramanian S <ssriniva...@caviumnetworks.com>
For key sizes greater than digest length, pad with zero rather than
computing hash of the key itself.
Fixes: 169ca3db550c ("crypto/armv8: add PMD optimized for ARMv8 processors")
Cc: sta...@dpdk.org
Signed-off-by: Srisivasubramanian S <ssriniva...@caviumnetworks.com>
---
drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c | 54 ++++++++--------------------
drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd_private.h | 4 +--
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c
b/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c
index c3ba439fc..a5c39c9b7 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd.c
@@ -291,27 +291,14 @@ auth_set_prerequisites(struct armv8_crypto_session *sess,
* Generate authentication key, i_key_pad and o_key_pad.
*/
/* Zero memory under key */
- memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH);
+ memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (xform->auth.key.length > SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * In case the key is longer than 160 bits
- * the algorithm will use SHA1(key) instead.
- */
- error = sha1_block(NULL, xform->auth.key.data,
- sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.length);
- if (error != 0)
- return -1;
- } else {
- /*
- * Now copy the given authentication key to the session
- * key assuming that the session key is zeroed there is
- * no need for additional zero padding if the key is
- * shorter than SHA1_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH.
- */
- rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
- xform->auth.key.length);
- }
+ /*
+ * Now copy the given authentication key to the session
+ * key.
+ */
+ rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
+ xform->auth.key.length);
/* Prepare HMAC padding: key|pattern */
auth_hmac_pad_prepare(sess, xform);
@@ -337,27 +324,14 @@ auth_set_prerequisites(struct armv8_crypto_session *sess,
* Generate authentication key, i_key_pad and o_key_pad.
*/
/* Zero memory under key */
- memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH);
+ memset(sess->auth.hmac.key, 0, SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (xform->auth.key.length > SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH) {
- /*
- * In case the key is longer than 256 bits
- * the algorithm will use SHA256(key) instead.
- */
- error = sha256_block(NULL, xform->auth.key.data,
- sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.length);
- if (error != 0)
- return -1;
- } else {
- /*
- * Now copy the given authentication key to the session
- * key assuming that the session key is zeroed there is
- * no need for additional zero padding if the key is
- * shorter than SHA256_AUTH_KEY_LENGTH.
- */
- rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
- xform->auth.key.length);
- }
+ /*
+ * Now copy the given authentication key to the session
+ * key.
+ */
+ rte_memcpy(sess->auth.hmac.key, xform->auth.key.data,
+ xform->auth.key.length);
/* Prepare HMAC padding: key|pattern */
auth_hmac_pad_prepare(sess, xform);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd_private.h
b/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd_private.h
index 679a71af3..d02992a64 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd_private.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/armv8/rte_armv8_pmd_private.h
@@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ struct armv8_crypto_session {
uint8_t o_key_pad[SHA_BLOCK_MAX]
__rte_cache_aligned;
/**< outer pad (max supported block length) */
- uint8_t key[SHA_AUTH_KEY_MAX];
- /**< HMAC key (max supported length)*/
+ uint8_t key[SHA_BLOCK_MAX];
+ /**< HMAC key (max supported block length)*/
} hmac;
};
uint16_t digest_length;
--
2.13.3
