> -----Original Message-----
> From: Anoob Joseph <ano...@marvell.com>
> Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 12:52 PM
> To: Van Haaren, Harry <harry.van.haa...@intel.com>
> Cc: Hemant Agrawal <hemant.agra...@nxp.com>; dev@dpdk.org; Matz,
> Olivier <olivier.m...@6wind.com>; Vidya Sagar Velumuri
> <vvelum...@marvell.com>; Thomas Monjalon <tho...@monjalon.net>; Akhil
> Goyal <gak...@marvell.com>; Jerin Jacob Kollanukkaran <jer...@marvell.com>;
> Konstantin Ananyev <konstantin.v.anan...@yandex.ru>
> Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH 2/3] security: add TLS record processing
>
> Hi Harry,
>
> Thanks for the review. Please see inline.
>
> Thanks,
> Anoob
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Van Haaren, Harry <harry.van.haa...@intel.com>
> > Sent: Wednesday, September 20, 2023 2:53 PM
> > To: Anoob Joseph <ano...@marvell.com>; Thomas Monjalon
> > <tho...@monjalon.net>; Akhil Goyal <gak...@marvell.com>; Jerin Jacob
> > Kollanukkaran <jer...@marvell.com>; Konstantin Ananyev
> > <konstantin.v.anan...@yandex.ru>
> > Cc: Hemant Agrawal <hemant.agra...@nxp.com>; dev@dpdk.org; Matz,
> > Olivier <olivier.m...@6wind.com>; Vidya Sagar Velumuri
> > <vvelum...@marvell.com>
> > Subject: [EXT] RE: [RFC PATCH 2/3] security: add TLS record processing
> >
> > External Email
> >
> > ----------------------------------------------------------------------
> > > -----Original Message-----
> > > From: Anoob Joseph <ano...@marvell.com>
> > > Sent: Friday, August 11, 2023 8:17 AM
> > > To: Thomas Monjalon <tho...@monjalon.net>; Akhil Goyal
> > > <gak...@marvell.com>; Jerin Jacob <jer...@marvell.com>; Konstantin
> > > Ananyev <konstantin.v.anan...@yandex.ru>
> > > Cc: Hemant Agrawal <hemant.agra...@nxp.com>; dev@dpdk.org; Matz,
> > > Olivier <olivier.m...@6wind.com>; Vidya Sagar Velumuri
> > > <vvelum...@marvell.com>
> > > Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/3] security: add TLS record processing
> > >
> > > Add Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer
> > > Security (DTLS). The protocols provide communications privacy for L4
> > > protocols such as TCP & UDP.
> > >
> > > TLS (and DTLS) protocol is composed of two layers, 1. TLS Record
> > > Protocol 2. TLS Handshake Protocol
> > >
> > > While TLS Handshake Protocol helps in establishing security parameters
> > > by which client and server can communicate, TLS Record Protocol
> > > provides the connection security. TLS Record Protocol leverages
> > > symmetric cryptographic operations such as data encryption and
> > > authentication for providing security to the communications.
> > >
> > > Cryptodevs that are capable of offloading TLS Record Protocol may
> > > perform other operations like IV generation, header insertion, atomic
> > > sequence number updates and anti-replay window check in addition to
> > > cryptographic transformations.
> > >
> > > The support is added for TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 and DTLS 1.2.
> >
> > From the code below, my understanding is that *ONLY* the record layer is
> > being added/supported? The difference is described well above, but the
> > intended support added is not clearly defined.
> >
> > Suggest reword the last line to clarify:
> > "Support for TLS record protocol is added for TLS 1.2, TLS 1.3 and DTLS
> > 1.2."
>
> [Anoob] Indeed. Will reword as suggested.
Thanks.
> > > Signed-off-by: Akhil Goyal <gak...@marvell.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Anoob Joseph <ano...@marvell.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Vidya Sagar Velumuri <vvelum...@marvell.com>
> > > ---
> > > doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst | 58 +++++++++++++
> > > lib/security/rte_security.c | 4 +
> > > lib/security/rte_security.h | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > > 3 files changed, 172 insertions(+)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst
> > > b/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst
> > > index 7418e35c1b..7716d7239f 100644
> > > --- a/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst
> > > +++ b/doc/guides/prog_guide/rte_security.rst
> > > @@ -399,6 +399,64 @@ The API ``rte_security_macsec_sc_create`` returns
> > > a handle for SC, and this handle is set in
> > > ``rte_security_macsec_xform`` to create a MACsec session using
> > > ``rte_security_session_create``.
> > >
> > > +TLS-Record Protocol
> > > +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> > > +
> > > +The Transport Layer Protocol provides communications security over
> > > +the
> > > Internet. The protocol
> > > +allows client/server applications to communicate in a way that is
> > > +designed to
> > > prevent eavesdropping,
> > > +tampering, or message forgery.
> > > +
> > > +TLS protocol is composed of two layers: the TLS Record Protocol and
> > > +the TLS
> > > Handshake Protocol. At
> > > +the lowest level, layered on top of some reliable transport protocol
> > > +(e.g., TCP),
> > > is the TLS Record
> > > +Protocol. The TLS Record Protocol provides connection security that
> > > +has two
> > > basic properties:
> > > +
> > > + - The connection is private. Symmetric cryptography is used for data
> > > + encryption (e.g., AES, DES, etc.). The keys for this symmetric
> > encryption
> > > + are generated uniquely for each connection and are based on a
> > > secret
> > > + negotiated by another protocol (such as the TLS Handshake
> > > Protocol).
> > The
> > > + Record Protocol can also be used without encryption.
> > > +
> > > + - The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message
> > > + integrity check using a keyed MAC. Secure hash functions (e.g.,
> > > + SHA-1, etc.) are used for MAC computations. The Record Protocol
> > > + can operate without a MAC, but is generally only used in this mode
> > > + while another protocol is using the Record Protocol as a transport
> > > + for negotiating security parameters.
> > > +
> > > +.. code-block:: c
> >
> > The code block below isn't C? Is there a better code block type for a text
> > diagram?
>
> [Anoob] Valid point. I was just following the general scheme followed in this
> file.
> May be, I'll introduce a .svg image for newly added code.
This was a nit-pick that perhaps "code-block:: text-diagram" or so exists.
No need to make a .svg in my opinion, the text-diagrams are clear.
> > > + Record Write Record Read
> > > + ------------ -----------
> > > +
> > > + TLSPlaintext TLSCiphertext
> > > + | |
> > > + ~ ~
> > > + | |
> > > + V V
> > > + +---------|----------+ +----------|---------+
> > > + | Seq. no generation | | Seq. no generation |
> > > + +---------|----------+ +----------|---------+
> > > + | |
> > > + +---------|----------+ +----------|---------+
> > > + | Header insertion | | Decryption & |
> > > + +---------|----------+ | MAC verification |
> > > + | +----------|---------+
> > > + +---------|----------+ |
> > > + | MAC generation & | +----------|---------+
> > > + | Encryption | | TLS Header removal |
> > > + +---------|----------+ +----------|---------+
> > > + | |
> > > + ~ ~
> > > + | |
> > > + V V
> > > + TLSCiphertext TLSPlaintext
> > > +
> > > +Supported Versions
> > > +^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
> > > +
> > > +* TLS 1.2
> > > +* TLS 1.3
> > > +* DTLS 1.2
> > >
> > > Device Features and Capabilities
> > > ---------------------------------
> > > diff --git a/lib/security/rte_security.c b/lib/security/rte_security.c
> > > index c4d64bb8e9..bd7b026547 100644
> > > --- a/lib/security/rte_security.c
> > > +++ b/lib/security/rte_security.c
> > > @@ -282,6 +282,10 @@ rte_security_capability_get(struct
> > > rte_security_ctx *instance,
> > > if (capability->docsis.direction ==
> > > idx->docsis.direction)
> > > return capability;
> > > + } else if (idx->protocol ==
> > > RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_TLS_RECORD) {
> > > + if (capability->tls_record.ver == idx-
> > > >tls_record.ver &&
> > > + capability->tls_record.type == idx-
> > > >tls_record.type)
> > > + return capability;
> > > }
> > > }
> > > }
> > > diff --git a/lib/security/rte_security.h b/lib/security/rte_security.h
> > > index 3b2df526ba..b9d064ed84 100644
> > > --- a/lib/security/rte_security.h
> > > +++ b/lib/security/rte_security.h
> > > @@ -620,6 +620,99 @@ struct rte_security_docsis_xform {
> > > /**< DOCSIS direction */
> > > };
> > >
> > > +/** Salt len to be used with AEAD algos in TLS 1.2 */ #define
> > > +RTE_SECURITY_TLS_1_2_SALT_LEN 4
> > > +/** Salt len to be used with AEAD algos in TLS 1.3 */ #define
> > > +RTE_SECURITY_TLS_1_3_SALT_LEN 12
> > > +/** Salt len to be used with AEAD algos in DTLS 1.2 */ #define
> > > +RTE_SECURITY_DTLS_1_2_SALT_LEN 4
> > > +
> > > +/** TLS version */
> > > +enum rte_security_tls_version {
> > > + RTE_SECURITY_VERSION_TLS_1_2, /**< TLS 1.2 */
> > > + RTE_SECURITY_VERSION_TLS_1_3, /**< TLS 1.3 */
> > > + RTE_SECURITY_VERSION_DTLS_1_2, /**< DTLS 1.2 */
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > +/** TLS session type */
> > > +enum rte_security_tls_sess_type {
> > > + /** Record read session
> > > + * - Decrypt & digest verification.
> > > + */
> > > + RTE_SECURITY_TLS_SESS_TYPE_READ,
> > > + /** Record write session
> > > + * - Encrypt & digest generation.
> > > + */
> > > + RTE_SECURITY_TLS_SESS_TYPE_WRITE,
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * Configure soft and hard lifetime of a TLS record session
> > > + *
> > > + * Lifetime of a TLS record session would specify the maximum number
> > > +of
> > > packets that can be
> > > + * processed. TLS record processing operations would start failing
> > > + once hard
> > > limit is reached.
> > > + *
> > > + * Soft limits can be specified to generate notification when the TLS
> > > + record
> > > session is approaching
> > > + * hard limits for lifetime. This would result in a warning returned
> > > + in
> > > ``rte_crypto_op.aux_flags``.
> >
> > Can we define "a warning" better? Perhaps an example of a soft-limit and
> > hard-limit, what the user can check aux_flags for, to identify? Or link to
> > the
> > appropriate part of the crypto_op.aux_flags documentation to help the user.
> >
>
> [Anoob] The concept of lifetime is present in most protocols. Idea is to
> limit the
> max number of operations performed with a session. Soft expiry notification is
> to help application prepare for an expiry and setup a new session before the
> current one expires.
Understood, yes.
> The idea was borrowed from IPsec which has the
> 'RTE_CRYPTO_OP_AUX_FLAGS_IPSEC_SOFT_EXPIRY' flag defined. But I realize, it
> should be better defined. I can rename the flag to
> 'RTE_CRYPTO_OP_AUX_FLAGS_SEC_SOFT_EXPIRY' to avoid redefining same flag
> for each security offload. Do you agree to this suggestion?
>
> https://elixir.bootlin.com/dpdk/latest/source/lib/cryptodev/rte_crypto.h#L67
So we cannot "just rename" the flag, its an API break. It likely is possible to
add an
additional #define with the same value as IPSEC_SOFT_EXPIRY, and call it
SEC_SOFT_EXPIRY.
Is that the best/most descriptive name? SYM_ALG_SOFT_EXPIRY? I'm not sure here,
input welcomed.
Perhaps we can improve the doc-string there, to explain what it means a bit
more verbosely.
> Do note that once hard expiry is hit, the operation would fail. Expectation
> is,
> cryptodev would return 'RTE_CRYPTO_OP_STATUS_ERROR' in case of errors.
That is good.
> > > + */
> > > +struct rte_security_tls_record_lifetime {
> > > + /** Soft expiry limit in number of packets */
> > > + uint64_t packets_soft_limit;
> > > + /** Hard expiry limit in number of packets */
> > > + uint64_t packets_hard_limit;
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > +/**
> > > + * TLS record protocol session configuration.
> > > + *
> > > + * This structure contains data required to create a TLS record security
> > session.
> > > + */
> > > +struct rte_security_tls_record_xform {
> > > + /** TLS record version. */
> > > + enum rte_security_tls_version ver;
> > > + /** TLS record session type. */
> > > + enum rte_security_tls_sess_type type;
> > > + /** TLS record session lifetime. */
> > > + struct rte_security_tls_record_lifetime life;
> > > + union {
> > > + /** TLS 1.2 parameters. */
> > > + struct {
> > > + /** Starting sequence number. */
> > > + uint64_t seq_no;
> > > + /** Salt to be used for AEAD algos. */
> > > + uint8_t salt[RTE_SECURITY_TLS_1_2_SALT_LEN];
> > > + } tls_1_2;
> > > +
> > > + /** TLS 1.3 parameters. */
> > > + struct {
> > > + /** Starting sequence number. */
> > > + uint64_t seq_no;
> > > + /** Salt to be used for AEAD algos. */
> > > + uint8_t salt[RTE_SECURITY_TLS_1_3_SALT_LEN];
> > > + /**
> > > + * Minimum payload length (in case of write
> > sessions).
> > > For shorter inputs,
> > > + * the payload would be padded appropriately before
> > > performing crypto
> >
> > Replace "would be" with "must be"? And who must do this step, is it the
> > application?
>
> [Anoob] Padding is performed by the PMD/cryptodev device. I'll change "would
> be" to "will be". Would that address your concern?
I suppose my concern is "is it clear to PMD authors that they must implement X
in their PMD",
and to ensure we (DPDK community) do our best to clarify API demands, and to
ensure future
contributions are of high quality too.
For example, could we have a security library unit-test that checks the padding
case, to
ensure correct & consistent behaviour across different crypto PMDs?
Same thoughts for SOFT and HARD error variants, (although they might take...
hours?) to execute.
But it is nice to automate-and-test these "corner cases".
It's not about wording, its about clarity between PMD devs, security library
devs, and application facing APIs,
to ensure that DPDK provides the most/best help it can to provide correctness.
Does that clarify what I'd like to see?
For this patchset, could we document a list of "caveats" when implementing PMD
functionality for TLS-record security offload, and indicate that:
1) Padding must be added by the PMD based on security library flags& algo in
use, not application layer (I know this is demanded by the sym algos anyway,
but let's make it explicit)
2) It is strongly recommended to build unit-tests for _SOFT and _HARD error
cases (potentially by "fast forwarding" the internal counters via private APIs
to avoid hours of enc/decryption)
I think that limits scope-impact to this patchset, but is clear for PMD
implementations in future what expectations are.
Thoughts, is that a good way forward?
> >
> > > + * transformations.
> > > + */
> > > + uint32_t min_payload_len;
> > > + } tls_1_3;
> > > +
> > > + /** DTLS 1.2 parameters */
> > > + struct {
> > > + /** Epoch value to be used. */
> > > + uint16_t epoch;
> > > + /** 6B starting sequence number to be used. */
> > > + uint64_t seq_no;
> > > + /** Salt to be used for AEAD algos. */
> > > + uint8_t salt[RTE_SECURITY_DTLS_1_2_SALT_LEN];
> > > + /** Anti replay window size to enable sequence
> > replay
> > > attack handling.
> > > + * Anti replay check is disabled if the window size is
> > > 0.
> > > + */
> > > + uint32_t ar_win_sz;
> > > + } dtls_1_2;
> > > + };
> > > +};
> > > +
> > > /**
> > > * Security session action type.
> > > */
> > > @@ -654,6 +747,8 @@ enum rte_security_session_protocol {
> > > /**< PDCP Protocol */
> > > RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_DOCSIS,
> > > /**< DOCSIS Protocol */
> > > + RTE_SECURITY_PROTOCOL_TLS_RECORD,
> > > + /**< TLS Record Protocol */
> > > };
> > >
> > > /**
> > > @@ -670,6 +765,7 @@ struct rte_security_session_conf {
> > > struct rte_security_macsec_xform macsec;
> > > struct rte_security_pdcp_xform pdcp;
> > > struct rte_security_docsis_xform docsis;
> > > + struct rte_security_tls_record_xform tls;
> >
> > Do we see TLS handshake xform being added in future? If so, is 'tls' a good
> > name, perhaps 'tls_record'?
> > That would allow 'tls_handshake' in future, with consistent naming scheme
> > without API/ABI break.
>
> [Anoob] In the future, I would like to see TLS handshake also offloaded in a
> similar manner. But that would need some fundamental changes in security
> library. Like, current security library is pretty much tied to symmetric
> operations but a handshake would involve both symmetric & asymmetric
> operations.
>
> Said that, I agree with your suggestion to rename the field. Will change it to
> 'tls_record' in next version.
Agreed, that handshake is significantly more complex, thanks for rename to
"tls_record".
>
> >
> >
> > > };
> > > /**< Configuration parameters for security session */
> > > struct rte_crypto_sym_xform *crypto_xform; @@ -1190,6 +1286,16
> > @@
> > > struct rte_security_capability {
> > > /**< DOCSIS direction */
> > > } docsis;
> > > /**< DOCSIS capability */
> > > + struct {
> > > + enum rte_security_tls_version ver;
> > > + /**< TLS record version. */
> > > + enum rte_security_tls_sess_type type;
> > > + /**< TLS record session type. */
> > > + uint32_t ar_win_size;
> > > + /**< Maximum anti replay window size supported
> > for
> > > DTLS 1.2 record read
> > > + * operation. Value of 0 means anti replay check is
> > not
> > > supported.
> > > + */
> > > + } tls_record;
> >
> > Missing /**< TLS Record Capability */ docstring here.
>
> [Anoob] Agreed. Will add in next version.
Thanks!
<snip>
