Infra does filter filenames that match (*.sha256) from the mirror replication, so it is possible to use such names and have matching behavior:
Compare mirror: http://apache.cs.utah.edu/orc/orc-1.2.3/ Apache version: http://www-eu.apache.org/dist/orc/orc-1.2.3/ and you can see the sha256 files are dropped just like the *.asc files. .. Owen On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 12:01 PM, Christopher <ctubb...@apache.org> wrote: > To be clear, those "trusted signatures" should be using strong hash > algorithms themselves. (As well as sufficiently long keys.) > I raised the issue of weak hashes in GPG signatures for Maven projects at > ASF with https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/MPOM-118 , but non-Maven > projects which manually sign releases should probably take care to ensure > their signatures are adequate. I consider this a release-voting quality > assurance step, and encourage projects to examine the signatures attached > to their release candidates as part of their release process. > > On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 2:27 PM Ted Dunning <ted.dunn...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > SHA1 and MD5 have been individually compromised, but a combined hash has > > not been. > > > > Regardless, Sebb's comment that hashes are worthless for authentication > and > > tamper-detection is spot-on. You have to look to trusted signatures for > > that. > > > > > > > > On Thu, Jan 26, 2017 at 10:20 AM, Mike Lissner < > > mliss...@michaeljaylissner.com> wrote: > > > > > I filed a bug about this already, but I've been directed to email here > > > instead. The bug I filed is: > > > https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/INFRA-12626 > > > > > > Basically, on download pages we provide obsolete hashes for our > downloads > > > (MD5 and SHA1). These are meant, as I understand it, to serve two > > purposes. > > > First, they allow you to make sure that your download succeeded. > Second, > > > they allow you to ensure that your download wasn't tampered with. > > > > > > For the first purpose: Great. They work. For the second purpose, > however, > > > we need to move away from MD5 and SHA1 hashes, both of which can now be > > > attacked with relatively modest hardware. > > > > > > Browsers are moving away from SHA1 at a very fast pace. See: > > > > > > https://security.googleblog.com/2014/09/gradually- > sunsetting-sha-1.html > > > > > > And: > > > > > > https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2014/09/23/phasing- > > > out-certificates-with-sha-1-based-signature-algorithms/ > > > > > > I don't know who's responsible for this, but my bug was closed because > > it's > > > not the infrastructure team, and so I'm trying here. > > > > > > I suggest we move to SHA2 hashes for all verification purposes. > > > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > Mike > > > > > > -- > Christopher >
