On 08/11/2015 10:18, Thomas Neidhart wrote: > On 11/07/2015 11:19 AM, Mark Thomas wrote: >> On 07/11/2015 10:13, Thomas Neidhart wrote: >>> On 11/07/2015 04:25 AM, Bernd Eckenfels wrote: >>>> Hello, >>>> >>>> I tried to raise that concern in the message already, but it is probably >>>> worth repeating it explicitly: this is not a real bug >>>> in the Commons-Collection class, and it might not be worse fixing it, as >>>> there are possibly tons of other vectors. This was also addressed by the >>>> original authors in the talk and even here on Twitter: >>>> >>>> https://twitter.com/gebl/status/662754611304996866 >>>> >>>> however, as the "foxglove" article shows, people still point at the >>>> apache project, and after all it is good pratice to reduce footprints >>>> and attack surfaces. >>> >>> it is clear that the InvokerTransformer by itself does not have a bug, >>> but due to the way how java serialization is applied and considering the >>> fact that at least collections-3.2.1 is used *a lot* it would make sense >>> to provide a hardened version of collections to give people a chance to >>> easily avoid this line of attack in their application. >>> >>> Instead of removing the class we could prevent de-serialization of it in >>> the hardened jar. This would not break b/c and it is very unlikely that >>> the InvokerTransformer is serialized in legit ways. >> >> Rather than having hardened vs unhardened JARs, it would probably be >> better to use a system property to enable/disable the behaviour. I don't >> know the code or the vulnerability well enough to know exactly where to >> put this switch so it prevents the attack but has minimal impact on >> other uses. > > my idea was to have a binary compatible drop-in replacement that does > not require any configuration, so that people that happen to have > commons-collections 3.2.1 in their classpath can replace it with a > hardened version. > > But I am open to other suggestions, in the end it is important to do > what affected users would like to have to mitigate the problem.
My main concern with a hardened JAR is that, while with just this vulnerability, we end up with two JARs but how many JARs will we end up with 3 or 4 vulnerabilities down the line. Particularly when fixing a vulnerability means breaking functionality. I think system properties scale better. Mark --------------------------------------------------------------------- To unsubscribe, e-mail: dev-unsubscr...@commons.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: dev-h...@commons.apache.org
