Hi.
On Sun, 28 Dec 2014 09:43:34 +0100, Luc Maisonobe wrote:
Le 28/12/2014 00:22, sebb a écrit :
On 27 December 2014 at 22:19, Gilles <gil...@harfang.homelinux.org>
wrote:
On Sat, 27 Dec 2014 17:48:05 +0000, sebb wrote:
On 24 December 2014 at 15:11, Gilles
<gil...@harfang.homelinux.org> wrote:
On Wed, 24 Dec 2014 15:52:12 +0100, Luc Maisonobe wrote:
Le 24/12/2014 15:04, Gilles a écrit :
On Wed, 24 Dec 2014 09:31:46 +0100, Luc Maisonobe wrote:
Le 24/12/2014 03:36, Gilles a écrit :
On Tue, 23 Dec 2014 14:02:40 +0100, luc wrote:
This is a [VOTE] for releasing Apache Commons Math 3.4 from
release
candidate 3.
Tag name:
MATH_3_4_RC3 (signature can be checked from git using 'git
tag
-v')
Tag URL:
<https://git-wip-us.apache.org/repos/asf?p=commons-math.git;a=commit;h=befd8ebd96b8ef5a06b59dccb22bd55064e31c34>
Is there a way to check that the source code referred to
above
was the one used to create the JAR of the ".class" files.
[Out of curiosity, not suspicion, of course...]
Yes, you can look at the end of the META-INF/MANIFEST.MS file
embedded
in the jar. The second-to-last entry is called
Implementation-Build.
It
is automatically created by maven-jgit-buildnumber-plugin and
contains
the SHA1 identifier of the last commit used for the build.
Here, is is
befd8ebd96b8ef5a06b59dccb22bd55064e31c34, so we can check it
really
corresponds to the expected status of the git repository.
Can this be considered "secure", i.e. can't this entry in the
MANIFEST
file be modified to be the checksum of the repository but with
the
.class
files being substitued with those coming from another
compilation?
Modifying anything in the jar (either this entry within the
manifest or
any class) will modify the jar signature. So as long as people
do check
the global MD5, SHA1 or gpg signature we provide with our build,
they
are safe to assume the artifacts are Apache artifacts.
This is not different from how releases are done with subversion
as the
source code control system, or even in C or C++ as the language.
At one
time, the release manager does perform a compilation and the
fellow
reviewers check the result. There is no fullproof process here,
as
always when security is involved. Even using an automated build
and
automatic signing on an Apache server would involve trust (i.e.
one
should assume that the server has not been tampered with, that
the build
process really does what it is expected to do, that the
artifacts put to
review are really the one created by the automatic process ...).
Another point is that what we officially release is the source,
which
can be reviewed by external users. The binary parts are merely a
convenience.
That's an interesting point to come back to since it looks like
the
most time-consuming part of a release is not related to the
sources!
Isn't it conceivable that a release could just be a commit
identifier
and a checksum of the repository?
If the binaries are a just a convenience, why put so much effort
in it?
As a convenience, the artefacts could be produced after the
release,
accompanied with all the "caveat" notes which you mentioned.
That would certainly increase the release rate.
Binary releases still need to be reviewed to ensure that the
correct N
& L files are present, and that the archives don't contain
material
with disallowed licenses.
It's not unknown for automated build processes to include files
that
should not be present.
I fail to see the difference of principle between the "release"
context
and, say, the daily snapshot context.
Snapshots are not (should not) be promoted to the general public as
releases of the ASF.
What I mean is that there seem to be a contradiction between saying
that
a "release" is only about _source_ and the obligation to check
_binaries_.
There is no contradiction here.
The ASF releases source, they are required in a release.
Binaries are optional.
That does not mean that the ASF mirror system can be used to
distribute arbitrary binaries.
It can occur that disallowed material is, at some point in time,
part of
the repository and/or the snapshot binaries.
However, what is forbidden is... forbidden, at all times.
As with most things, this is not a strict dichotomy.
If it is indeed a problem to distribute forbidden material,
shouldn't
this be corrected in the repository? [That's indeed what you did
with
the blocking of the release.]
If the repo is discovered to contain disallowed material, it needs
to
be removed.
Then again, once the repository is "clean", it can be tagged and
that
tagged _source_ is the release.
Not quite.
A release is a source archive that is voted on and distributed via
the
ASF mirror system.
The contents must agree with the source tag, but the source tag is
not
the release.
Non-compliant binaries would thus only be the result of a "mistake"
(if the build system is flawed, it's another problem, unrelated to
the released contents, which is _source_) to be corrected per se.
Not so. There are other failure modes.
An automated build obviously reduces the chances of mistakes, but it
can still create an archive containing files that should not be
there.
[Or indeed, omits files that should be present]
For example, the workspace contains spurious files which are
implicitly included by the assembly instructions.
Or the build process creates spurious files that are incorrectly
added
to the archive.
Or the build incorrectly includes jars that are supposed to be
provided by the end user
etc.
I have seen all the above in RC votes.
There are probably other falure modes.
My proposition is that it's an independent step: once the build
system is adjusted to the expectations, "correct" binaries can be
generated from the same tagged release.
It does not matter when the binary is built.
If it is distributed by the PMC as a formal release, it must not
contain any surprises, e.g. it must be licensed under the AL.
It is therefore vital that the contents are as expected from the
build.
Note also that a formal release becomes an act of the PMC by the
voting process.
The ASF can then assume responsibility for any legal issues that may
arise.
Otherwise it is entirely the personal responsibility of the person
who
releases it.
I think the last two points are really important: binaries must be
checked and the foundation provides a legal protection for the
project
if something weird occurs.
I also think another point is important: many if not most users do
really expect binaries and not source. From our internal Apache point
of view, these are a by-product,. For many others it is the important
thing. It is mostly true in maven land as dependencies are
automatically retrieved in binary form, not source form. So the maven
central repository as a distribution system is important.
Even if for some security reason it sounds at first thought logical
to
rely on source only and compile oneself, in an industrial context
project teams do not have enough time to do it for all their
dependencies, so they use binaries provided by trusted third parties.
A
long time ago, I compiled a lot of free software tools for the
department I worked for at that time. I do not do this anymore, and
trust the binaries provided by the packaging team for a distribution
(typically Debian). They do rely on source and compile themselves.
Hey,
I even think Emmanuel here belongs to the Debian java team ;-) I
guess
such teams that do rely on source are rather the exception than the
rule. The other examples I can think of are packaging teams,
development teams that need bleeding edge (and will also directly
depend on the repository, not even the release), projects that need
to
introduce their own patches and people who have critical needs (for
example when safety of people is concerned or when they need full
control for legal or contractual reasons). Many other people download
binaries directly and would simply not consider using a project if it
is not readily available: they don't have time for this and don't
want
to learn how to build tens or hundred of different projects they
simply
use.
I do not disagree with anything said on this thread. [In particular, I
did not at all imply that any one committer could take responsibility
for releasing unchecked items.]
I'm simply suggesting that what is called the release
process/management
could be made simpler (and _consequently_ could lead to more regularly
releasing the CM code), by separating the concerns.
The concerns are
1. "code" (the contents), and
2. "artefacts" (the result of the build system acting on the "code").
Checking of one of these is largely independent from checking the
other.
[The more so that, as you said, no fool-proof link between the two can
be ensured: From a security POV, checking the former requires a code
review, while using the latter requires trust in the build system.]
Thus we could release the "code", after checking and voting on the
concerned elements (i.e. the repository state corresponding to a
specific tag + the web site).
Then we could release the "binaries", as a convenience, after checking
and voting on the concerned elements (i.e. the files about to be
distributed).
I think that it's an added flexibility that would, for example, allow
the tagging of the repository without necessarily release binaries
(i.e.
not involving that part of the work); and to release binaries (say, at
regular intervals) based on the latest tagged code (i.e. not involving
the work about solving/evaluating/postponing issues).
[I completely admit that, at first, it might look a little more
confusing for the plain user, but (IIUC) it would be a better
representation of the reality covered by stating that the ASF
releases source code.]
Best regards,
Gilles
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