Agreed on not being a queryable field. That would also preclude secondary indexing, right?
On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 11:20 AM Benedict <bened...@apache.org> wrote: > Applying this should prevent querying on a field, else you could leak its > contents, surely? This pretty much prohibits using it in a clustering key, > and a partition key with the ordered partitioner - but probably also a > hashed partitioner since we do not use a cryptographic hash and the hash > function is well defined. > > We probably also need to ensure that any ALLOW FILTERING queries on such a > field are disabled. > > Plausibly the data could be cryptographically jumbled before using it in a > primary key component (or permitting filtering), but it is probably easier > and safer to exclude for now… > > On 23 Aug 2022, at 18:13, Aaron Ploetz <aaronplo...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > Some thoughts on this one: > > In a prior job, we'd give app teams access to a single keyspace, and two > roles: a read-write role and a read-only role. In some cases, a > "privileged" application role was also requested. Depending on the > requirements, I could see the UNMASK permission being applied to the RW or > privileged roles. But if there's a problem on the table and the operators > go in to investigate, they will likely use a SUPERUSER account, and they'll > see that data. > > How hard would it be for SUPERUSERs to *not* automatically get the UNMASK > permission? > > I'll also echo the concerns around masking primary key components. It's > highly likely that certain personal data properties would be used as a > partition or clustering key (ex: range query for people born within a > certain timeframe). In addition to the "breaks existing" concern, I'm > curious about the challenges around getting that to work with the current > primary key implementation. > > Does this first implementation only apply to payload (non-key) columns? > The examples in the CEP currently do not show primary key components being > masked. > > Thanks, > > Aaron > > > On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 6:44 AM Henrik Ingo <henrik.i...@datastax.com> > wrote: > >> On Tue, Aug 23, 2022 at 1:10 PM Andrés de la Peña <adelap...@apache.org> >> wrote: >> >>> One thought: The way the CEP is currently written, it is only possible >>>> to mask a column one way. You can only define one masking function for a >>>> column, and since you use the original column name, you could only return >>>> one version of it in the result set, even if you had a way to define >>>> several functions. >>>> >>> >>> Right, it's one single type of mapping per the column, declared on >>> CREATE/ALTER TABLE statements. Also, users can manually specify their own >>> masking function in SELECT statements if they have permissions for seeing >>> the clear data. >>> >>> For those cases where the data is automatically masked for an >>> unprivileged user, I don't see the use of including different types of >>> masking for the same column into the same result set. Instead, we might be >>> interested on having different types of masking associated to different >>> roles. We could do so with dedicated CREATE/DROP/LIST MASK statements, >>> instead of using the CREATE/ALTER/DESCRIBE TABLE statements. That CREATE >>> MASK statement would associate a masking function to a column and role. >>> However, I'm not sure we need that type of granularity instead of the >>> simplicity of attaching the masking to the column declaration. wdyt? >>> >>> >>> >> My gut feeling likewise is that this adds complexity but little value. >> >>> >>>> >> >> -- >> >> Henrik Ingo >> >> +358 40 569 7354 <358405697354> >> >> [image: Visit us online.] <https://www.datastax.com/> [image: Visit us >> on Twitter.] <https://twitter.com/DataStaxEng> [image: Visit us on >> YouTube.] >> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.youtube.com_channel_UCqA6zOSMpQ55vvguq4Y0jAg&d=DwMFaQ&c=adz96Xi0w1RHqtPMowiL2g&r=IFj3MdIKYLLXIUhYdUGB0cTzTlxyCb7_VUmICBaYilU&m=bmIfaie9O3fWJAu6lESvWj3HajV4VFwgwgVuKmxKZmE&s=16sY48_kvIb7sRQORknZrr3V8iLTfemFKbMVNZhdwgw&e=> >> [image: Visit my LinkedIn profile.] >> <https://www.linkedin.com/in/heingo/> >> > -- +---------------------------------------------------------------+ | Derek Chen-Becker | | GPG Key available at https://keybase.io/dchenbecker and | | https://pgp.mit.edu/pks/lookup?search=derek%40chen-becker.org | | Fngrprnt: EB8A 6480 F0A3 C8EB C1E7 7F42 AFC5 AFEE 96E4 6ACC | +---------------------------------------------------------------+
