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https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ATLAS-5388?page=com.atlassian.jira.plugin.system.issuetabpanels:all-tabpanel
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Paresh Devalia updated ATLAS-5388:
----------------------------------
    Summary: Topic-scoped authorization for REST notification POST 
(POST_NOTIFICATION + AtlasNotificationRequest)  (was: REST notification POST 
authorization is admin-level and not topic-scoped, topicName path parameter is 
ignored in auth decision)

> Topic-scoped authorization for REST notification POST (POST_NOTIFICATION + 
> AtlasNotificationRequest)
> ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>                 Key: ATLAS-5388
>                 URL: https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/ATLAS-5388
>             Project: Atlas
>          Issue Type: Bug
>          Components:  atlas-core
>    Affects Versions: 3.0.0
>            Reporter: Umesh Patil
>            Assignee: Umesh Patil
>            Priority: Major
>
> h2. Problem Statement
>  
> REST hook notification ingress (rest-notification-webapp, port 41000) 
> authorizes POST requests using an *admin-shaped* privilege 
> ({{{}service-notification-post{}}}) via {{{}AtlasAdminAccessRequest{}}}. The 
> {{topicName}} URL path parameter (e.g. {{{}ATLAS_HOOK{}}}, 
> {{{}ATLAS_ENTITIES{}}}) is used for Kafka routing.
>  
> This creates a security and policy-model gap:
>  * Authorization cannot enforce least privilege per notification topic
>  * A caller granted admin notification permission can POST to *any* topic
>  * Hook service accounts cannot be scoped to a single topic (e.g. 
> {{hivehook}} → {{ATLAS_HOOK}} only)
>  * No first-class resource type {{notification-topic}} exists for Ranger 
> policy modeling
>  * Privilege {{service-notification-post}} was never properly wired in Ranger 
> Atlas service-def
>  
> h2. Security Impact
>  
>  * Violates principle of least privilege for hook/service accounts
>  * Inconsistent with entity/type authorization model (which is 
> resource-scoped)
>  * REST notification APIs as potentially allowing unauthorized message 
> injection
>  * Production Ranger deployments cannot create topic-scoped policies until 
> Ranger plugin is updated (follow-up)
>  
> h2. Affected Endpoint
>  
> {code:java}
> POST http://<host>:41000/rest/api/atlas/v2/notification/topic/\{topicName}
> {code}
>  
>  * {{topicName}} examples: {{{}ATLAS_HOOK{}}}, {{ATLAS_ENTITIES}}
>  
> h2. Root Cause 
>  
> ||Area||Before (broken design)||
> |Request type|{{AtlasAdminAccessRequest}}|
> |Privilege checked|{{SERVICE_NOTIFICATION_POST}} 
> ({{{}service-notification-post{}}})|
> |Topic in auth decision|*No* — {{topicName}} ignored|
> |Simple policy section|No {{notificationPermissions}} in 
> {{atlas-simple-authz-policy.json}}|
> |Ranger resource type|No {{notification-topic}} in service-def|
>  
>  
>  *Authorization call in NotificationREST:*
> {code}
> verifyAccess(new AtlasAdminAccessRequest(SERVICE_NOTIFICATION_POST), ...)
> {code}
>  
>  



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