[ See formatted version here: 
https://wiki.mozilla.org/SecurityEngineering/Newsletter ]

= Firefox Security Team Newsletter Q3 17 =

Firefox Quantum is almost here, and contains several important security 
improvements. Improved sandboxing, web platform hardening, crypto performance 
improvements and much more. Read on to find out all the security goodness 
coming through the Firefox pipeline.

- Sandbox work is seeing great progress. As of 57, Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux 
all have file system access restricted by the sandbox which is a major 
milestone reached. Further restrictions are enabled for Windows in Firefox 58.

- Firefox 57 treats now data URLs as unique origins, reducing the risk of 
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

- The Firefox Multi-Account Containers Add-on shipped, allowing users to juggle 
multiple identities in a single browsing session.

- Increased AES-GCM performance in Firefox 56, and support for Curve25519 in 
Firefox 57 (the first formally verified cryptographic algorithm in a web 
browser)

- Experimental support for anti-phishing FIDO U2F “Security Key” USB devices 
landed behind a preference in Firefox 57. This feature is a forerunner to W3C 
Web Authentication, which will bring this anti-phishing technology to a wider 
market.

- The privacy WebExtension API can now be used to control the 
privacy.resistFingerprinting preference and first party isolation



= Team Highlights =


= Security Engineering =
== Crypto Engineering ==
- AES-GCM performance is increased across the board, making large transfers 
more efficient in Firefox 56.
- Our implementation of Curve25519 in Firefox 57 is the first formally verified 
cryptographic algorithm in a web browser.
- Experimental support for anti-phishing FIDO U2F “Security Key” USB devices 
landed behind a preference in Firefox 57. This feature is a forerunner to W3C - 
- Web Authentication, which will bring this anti-phishing technology to a wider 
market.


== Privacy and Content Security==
- The privacy WebExtension API can now be used to control the 
privacy.resistFingerprinting preference and first party isolation
- Containers launched as an extension available from AMO
- Containers have had a few improvements for web extensions:
Containers now enabled when installing a contextual identity extension, Events 
to monitor container changes, Ability to get icon urls for containers along 
with hex colour codes, Cleaner APIs
- Lightbeam was remade as a web extension.
- Firefox 57 treats data URLs as unique origins  which mitigates the risk of 
XSS, make Firefox standard-compliant and consistent with the behavior of other 
browsers.
- Shipped version 4 of the Safe Browsing protocol.

== Firefox and Tor Integration ==
-Continue the Tor patch uplift work focusing on browser fingerprinting 
resistance
- Landed 12 more anti-fingerprinting patches in 57
- The MinGW build has landed in mozilla-central and is available in treeherder

==Content Isolation==
- Various Windows content process security features enabled over the quarter 
including disabling of legacy extension points (56), image load policy 
improvements (57), increased restrictions on job objects (58), and finally 
we've enabled the alternate desktop feature in Nightly after battling various 
problems with anti-virus software interfering with child process startup.
- The new 'default deny' read access policy for the Linux file access broker is 
now enabled by default for content processes and is rolling out in Firefox 57. 
The broker forwards content process file access requests to the parent process 
for approval, severely restricting what a compromised content process could do 
within the local file system.
- Numerous access rules associated with file system, operating system services, 
and device access have been removed from the OSX content process sandbox. In 
terms of file system access, we've reached parity with Chrome's renderer. 
Remaining print server access will be removed in Q4, removal of graphics and 
audio access is currently in planning.
- We continue to invest in cleaning up various areas of the code that have 
accumulated technical debt.
 - We’ve completed our research on the scope of enabling the Win32k System Call 
Disable Policy feature. This feature will isolate content processes from a 
large class of Win32k kernel APIs commonly used to gain sandbox escape and 
privilege escalation. Planning for this long term project is currently underway 
with work expected to commence in Q4.
- As a result of the stability and process startup problems encountered due to 
3rd party code injection, a new internal initiative has formed to better 
address problems associated with unstable software injected into Firefox. This 
cross-team group will explore and improve policy revolving around outreach and 
blocking, data collection and research, and improved injection mitigation 
techniques within Firefox.


= Operations Security =
- addons.mozilla.org and Firefox Screenshots went through external security 
audits. The reports will be released soon.
- Internal audits of Crash Reports and Phabricator were completed and have 
found no maximum or high risk issues.
- addons.mozilla.org, Crash Reports, Telemetry,  Pontoon, Push and Tracking 
Protection backends have been connected to pyup.io to track vulnerabilities in 
upstream Python dependencies.
- Verification of the signature of installer and update files has been 
integrated to the product delivery pipeline, to prevent an attacker from 
feeding an improperly signed file to our download sites.


= Security Assurance =
- Developed new static analysis tool to detect sandbox-related flaws in IPDL 
endpoints.
- Established mobile security review process to cover projects coming through 
New Mobile Experience pipeline.
- Identified a number of warnings by building for Windows with gcc, and 
resolved many of them.

= Cross-Team Initiatives =
Google has become an official Root Store Member of the Common CA Database 
(CCADB).  


Security Blog Posts & Presentations
https://blog.mozilla.org/firefox/introducing-firefox-multi-account-containers/
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/09/29/improving-aes-gcm-performance/
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/09/13/verified-cryptography-firefox-57/
https://hacks.mozilla.org/2017/10/remaking-lightbeam-as-a-browser-extension/
https://blog.mozilla.org/security/2017/10/04/treating-data-urls-unique-origins-firefox-57/
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