Hi all,

the next Nightly build will have a significantly tightened Linux
sandbox. Writes are no longer allowed except to shared memory (for IPC),
and to the system TMPDIR (and we're eventually going to get rid of the
latter, perhaps with an intermediate step to a Firefox-content-specific
tmpdir).

There might be some compatibility fallout from this. Extensions/add-ons
that try to write from the content process will no longer work, but the
impact there should be limited given that similar (and stricter)
restrictions have been tried out on macOS. (See bug 1187099 and bug
1288874 for info/discussion). Because Firefox currently still loads a
number of external libraries into the content process (glib, gtk,
pulseaudio, etc) there is some risk of breakage there as well. You know
where to report (Component: Security - Process Sandboxing).

This behavior can be controlled via a pref:
pref("security.sandbox.content.level", 2);

Reverting this to 1 goes back to the previous behavior where the set of
allowable system calls is restricted, but no filtering happens on
filesytem IO.

When Firefox is built with debugging enabled, it will log any policy
violations. Currently, a clean Nightly build will show some of those.
They are inconsequential, and we'll deal with them, eventually. (Patches
welcome though!)

-- 
GCP
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