Very briefly: On 21/04/15 12:43, skuldw...@gmail.com wrote: > 1. User downloads a browser (be it Firefox, Chrome, Opera, etc.) > securely (https?) from the official download location. 2. Upon > installation a private key is created for that browser installation > and signed by the browser's certificate server.
This makes checking in with the browser maker a necessary prerequisite for secure connections. That has problems. > 3. When the user > later connect to a server that support automatic encryption, the > browser sends a (public) session key that the server should use, this > key is signed with the browser installation key, the server can > verify the signature and that this key is not modified by checking > the certificate server. What you just built is a unique identifier for every browser which can be tracked across sites. > 4. The server exchanges it's session key with > the browser. 5. A secure/encrypted connection is now possible. Except that the browser has not yet identified the site. It is important for the user to check the site is genuine before the user sends any important information to it. > The benefit is that there is no server side certificates needed to > establish a encrypted connection. They are needed if the user wants to have any confidence in who they are actually talking to. Gerv _______________________________________________ dev-platform mailing list dev-platform@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-platform
