Le 24/12/2014 17:37, Nicholas Alexander a écrit :
> Yes, I'm all for using curves like *25519, which is what backs
> libsodium.  In fact, I want to use it for FxA public/private key pairs
> precisely so that it's easier to generate strong keypairs without
> having to do RSA or DSA key generation.  But that's not what I'm
> talking about here.
>
> This isn't about limiting the number of key pairs at any point in the
> flow.  What I wanted to limit was the number transferred during one
> interaction, meaning the user agent can say "only give me these 3
> keys" rather than getting an unbounded list of keys.  The motivation
> is that, as written, it looks like we guarantee the entire set of
> possible keys gets transferred, and every one is public key encrypted
> -- separately -- with the same public key.  What I'm suggesting is to
> do *one* public key encryption of the set of keys.

Ok for me they are only kAr and kBr (kAr linked to an account, kBr
linked to an account's password)

>  
>
>     What I understood is that the public key is send only on the
>     /authorization endpoint and kept for use on the /token
>
>
> The spec returns the keys that was sent to /authorization.  If we're
> tunneling them through, but we can't rely on them, why tunnel them at all?

I didn't get that. What cannot we rely on and what do you want to tunnel?

In the FxA database they are kA and wrap-kB that we derive to get
encrypted((kAr,kBr), DH(transactionPublicKey, tempPrivateKey)) that we
get back on /token with tempPublicKey.
And transactionPublicKey is sent on /authorization

My question is how do we makes sure that the server doesn't store/log
kAr and kBr before encryption?

— Rémy
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