Quoted below, I'd suggested holding a 2nd Up/Down ratification vote on the winner of an election between several mutually-competting proposals to amend the consititution, and requireing it to get 3 time more Yes votes than No votes in that 2nd vote, the Yes/No ratification vote.
It occurs to me that, instead of holding a 2nd vote, the Yes/No vote, one could instead just look at the rankings from the Schwartz Woodall election to find out if the winner is ranked over D by 3 times more ballots than rank D over it. So the only purpose of D in the ranking would be 1) For treating it like any other option, to find out if D wins; and 2) For finding out, after the winner is found, if that eventual winner of the Schwartz Woodlall count beats D by 3 to 1. Below is quoted what I said in my previous post: Of course a similar procedure could be used with CSSD too. And it might make chicken dilemma defection not quite as easy, becauses the only defection problem would be the one that is inherent in CSSD. But of course that inherent CSSD chicken dilemma problem would remain, if CSSD is used. I was speaking instead of using, with Schwartz Woodall, a 3:1 V(x,D)/V(D,x) requirement--_to be applied after (and if) some x wins_ to determine whether that winner passes the 3:1 supermajority requirement--because we were discussing how the supermajority requirement could be applied while still retaining Schwartz Woodall's freedom from chicken dilemma. -------------------------------------------------- [quote] But how about this?: Instead of applying the 3:1 requirement before doing Schwartz Woodall, why not apply it _after_ the Schwartz Woodall count. Hold a 2nd Yes/No ratification vote, for the options that wins the Schwartz Woodall count. In that Yes/No vote, require that the option get 3 times more "Yes" votes than "No" votes in order to win. So: : For constitutional amendments: First, just do Schwartz Woodall., among the various options for amending the constitution. If D wins, then have more discussion, with another vote later. If D doesn't win, then whatever option wins, for a constitutional amendment, hold a 2nd vote, a Yes/No vote on that amendment. The amendment passes only if it gets 3 times more "Yes" votes than "No" votes. In that way, the 3:1 supermajoriity requirement is preserved, without losing Schwartz Woodall's freedom from chicken dilemma. [/quote] -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-vote-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: http://lists.debian.org/caokdy5dtrdmefe_sh+kuv13-lmyrdt-jomyjlqdezxvrcmc...@mail.gmail.com
