On Fri, Feb 10, 2006 at 11:37:59AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote: > > You can't argue that since the constitution doesn't explicitly forbid the > > Secretary to take it upon him/herself to interpret the DFSG for everyone > > else, that therefore he/she must do so, in order to discharge the > > constitutional duty of placing 3:1 supermajorities on amendments, etc. > > That's backwards. Essentially you'd be asserting that any delegate has _any > > power_ he or she deems necessary to fulfill his or her view of their own > > constitutional duties, unless explicitly forbidden, item by item, by the > > constitution.
> That's not my argument. > And, likewise, you can't argue that the secretary must treat an option > as accepted when preparing the ballot. Treating controversial > general resolution proposals as if they'd already won the vote before > the vote begins would be the very abuse of power you're alluding to. So by this reasoning, is the original GR proposal not "controversial", whereas the other two amendments are? What's the key difference, if it isn't that the Project Secretary thinks one is correct and the others are not? -- Steve Langasek Give me a lever long enough and a Free OS Debian Developer to set it on, and I can move the world. [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.debian.org/
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