Currently, I'm considering what I'm thinking of as Anthony Town's
proposal.   By this, I mean:
______________________________________________________________________
quorum is number of submitted votes

supermajority multiplies vote counts for default option when comparing
with supermajority vote counts.

A defeat by the default option is never the weakest defeat.
______________________________________________________________________

Looking at the past examples of supermajority problems, I'm
fairly happy with how this system treats those examples. 

Here's a list of the tests I considered:


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        A needs 2:1, B simple majority, D default option.
        3 ABD
        1 BDA
        1 DAB
        An informal Nov 17 proposal defaulted this election

tie between B and D [which is reasonable]


        A needs 2:1, B simple majority, D default option.
        60 A B D
        30 B A D
        10 D B A
        An informal Nov 17 proposal resulted in B winning instead of A.

A wins

        S and T both need 2:1, D is default
        60 S T D
        50 T D S
        An informal Nov 17 proposal had D win instead of T.

T wins


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        A needs 2:1, B 1:1, D default
        60 A B D
        30 B D A
        10 D B A
        B should win.

B wins


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        A has 2:1 supermajority, N is default
        4 cAbN
        1 cNAb
        3 bcNa
        3 AbcN
        [c should win]

c wins


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        Z is default
        40  A
        25  B
        35  Z B A
        A should not win.

Z wins

        Z is default
        40  A Z B
        25  B
        35  Z B A
        A should not win.

Z wins


     Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

        A 3:1, B 1:1, F default
        70 ABF
        30 BAF
        10 AFB
        A should win (one draft had B winning)

A wins

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        Quorum of n, no supermajorities:
        25 D A B
        30 B D A
        35 A B D
        A is CpSSD winner, the majority prefers B over the default option.
        [In the proposal being discussed, these votes didn't meet quorum,
        and D won.]

B wins [reasonable since most people do not approve of A]
D wins if quorum isn't met


     Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

        A requires 2:1, B 1:1, D default
        60 A
        40 B D A
        A should win [in one proposal, D wins]

A wins


     Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

        A 3:1, B 1:1, D default
        20 B D A
        10 D A B
        80 A B D
        A should not win [one supermajority proposal had A winning]

B wins


FYI,

-- 
Raul

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