On Mon, Dec 18, 2000 at 01:07:32PM -0500, I wrote: > The current mechanism can be made to ignore circular ties -- essentially, > you have to use A.6(2..4) only when there's a tie among first-preference > options (and A.6(6) when there's an all-around tie). [Also, to properly > handle votes with mixed supermajorities, you have to eliminate the > "final" from A.6(7).]
P.S. [I should have said this when I was responding to Manoj]: Note that it's possible to have a pure tie among first preferences, and a circular tie when considering all preferences, and yet still have enough distinction between the choices to pick a winner. Handling this right (not dumping it on the person with casting vote, not voiding the vote) means some kind of mechanism to extend single transferrable vote to second preferences (and third, etc.). -- Raul
