On 07/08/2024 11:40, to...@tuxteam.de wrote:
In my threat model, if I already have an application running under
my own user ID, I call XKCD 1200 [1] on it.
Browser JavaScript API allows to read and write clipboard. It is
protected to some extent by user prompts. On the other hand in ChromeOS
most of applications are running in browser, so I will not be surprised
if policy becomes more permissive some day despite developers are aware
of related security issues.
Are you sure that you have never accidentally granted clipboard read
permission to some frequently used web site?
So a threat may be outside of "traditional" local processes.
As to X11 protocol, it allows to grab focus, e.g. xterm supports it.
Several years ago GNOME designers decided that their password prompt
must be full screen modal dialogue that does not allow even mouse
interaction with other applications (e.g. 3rd party password managers).
On the other hand it does not protect against xinput debug tools running
at lower level.
