on Sun, Nov 30, 2003 at 11:21:24PM +0100, Miernik ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: > On 2003-11-30, Karsten M. Self <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> I recommend making it far larger than in the Debian security doc > >> though. On my servers I have /boot and /usr read-only, and I've been > > > > You can leave /boot unmounted altogether. The only times it needs to be > > accessed are: > > > > - At boot time, where access is direct to partition, and the partition > > need not be mounted (indeed, can't be). > > > > - When examining kernel config files and System maps (read-only) > > > > - When installing a new kernel (writeable) > > Show me a good reason to separete /boot to a separate partition at > all. What's the extra security we get out of this?
The kernel file itself isn't available to be mucked with, until _after_ the cracker gains shell, gains root, and remounts the partition. If your kernel is on physically nonwritable media, this means that you have, at least, a chance at having a trusted kernel on the system at reboot. > In /boot there are only the kernel images. System.map's, kernel > config, and GRUB config. > > All that is writable only by root anyway (perms -rw-r--r-- root.root) > If an attacker get's rights to write or change perms of files there, > he can equally easy remount the partition rw. > > So what's the point? The sharp bit at the end. Peace. -- Karsten M. Self <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> http://kmself.home.netcom.com/ What Part of "Gestalt" don't you understand? The truth behind the H-1B IT indentured servant scam: http://heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/itaa.real.html
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