On Thu, 27 Nov 2003, Russell Coker wrote:
> On Thu, 27 Nov 2003 04:51, Matt Zimmerman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Big money does not imply big security. Large corporations with lots of > > money to spend on security are compromised all the time. Obviously, they > > aren't as forthcoming about it as Debian due to monetary concerns, but even > > those incidents which are publicized are enough to demonstrate this. > > You are forgetting one important point. You have to NOTICE a hack before you > can fix it. Big companies have a bad history of not even knowing that they > are hacked if their web page is not defaced. > > One company I worked for had a machine where Apache would SEGV about 10,000 > times per day. I expect that you could exploit the system to execute > arbitary code, which could then gain access to the internal network. > > In spite of this my colleagues believed that their firewall did everything > necessary to protect the internal network. The network was configured such > that anyone who had access to the internal network effectively had root on > all machines (there were so many ways of getting root it wasn't funny). > > AFAIK that network is still running in the same manner... normally, it takes someone having gotten in before managers consider "that a problem" and will go and fix it ... and allocate $$$ to fix it taking away their $$$ for other things bigger the company, worst the budget for fixing things ( if it needs fixing ) before it becames an obvious emergency to get it fixed which is typically 100x more expensive after the fact maybe a polite question to them would be, i'll get foo-high-school-kiddie to try to get in ... to get the point across... than they can fix their firewall and other security process in whatever way they see fit ( at least its an in-expensive pen-test for them ) ( but get it in writing that its okay to check some ( exploit tools against their network c ya alvin