Robert, The only way to truly recover from a break-in, is to fully restore the system from a trusted medium. That being said, here's what your script does:
1) Hide it's name in the process table as '/usr/sbin/nscd ' (100 spaces). 2) Bind to UDP port 1337 in order to receive control information and wait. For this script to take any action, 3 arguments must be supplied: password, command, and at least one argument. For some commands two arguments are needed. ping: Sends a single udp packet to $arg1 on port $arg2. This packet contains the word 'pong', followed by the output of 'uname -mnrs'. redir: Redirect a $localport to a remote $host an port. shell: open a shell on a supplied port. The shell will be opened with the permissions of the user running the crontab (www-data), but root may then be attainable by a number of local exploits. ptrace is the first and easiest that comes to mind. udp: Sends a string containing 1337 copies of: 'Mess with the best - die like a rest!' as often as possible to a supplies $host for a given amount of $time. The destination port is random. ** Shouldn't it be 'Mess with the best - die like the rest!' anyway? I guess we haven't messed with those that are best at grammar. ddns: Begins a DOS attack to a specified dns $host, for a given amount of $time. die: If the correct password is supplied, this script will exit. Hope it helps clear things up. --jordan > > I have a question as to how safe a box is after > it has been compromised by this perl script. > I believe it opens up a shell account at 1337, > but it shouldn't give them root access or the > ability to log in as the web user at most should > it ? Cuz if so that would be bad news for a lot > of people who got hacked via this. Regardless I > upgraded my kernel to the new version, is there > anything else I should do to ensure there were > no backdoors implemented by this. Also thanks > for all of the initial help and responses I > received. The debian community is truly a great > example of mutual aid in effect. > > Robert Ebright > sysadmin at azone.org >