--- Begin Message ---
Package: release.debian.org
Severity: normal
User: release.debian....@packages.debian.org
Usertags: unblock
Please unblock package ruby2.1
2.1.5-3 containts the fix for the recently announced CVE-2015-1855: Ruby
OpenSSL Hostname Verification
https://www.ruby-lang.org/en/news/2015/04/13/ruby-openssl-hostname-matching-vulnerability/
Follows the diff from the git repository wrt the version in testing. The
actual debdiff will contain a diff-in-a-diff and will be less convenient
to read.
unblock ruby2.1/2.1.5-3
-- System Information:
Debian Release: 8.0
APT prefers buildd-unstable
APT policy: (500, 'buildd-unstable'), (500, 'unstable'), (500, 'testing'),
(1, 'experimental')
Architecture: amd64 (x86_64)
Kernel: Linux 3.16.0-4-amd64 (SMP w/4 CPU cores)
Locale: LANG=pt_BR.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=pt_BR.UTF-8 (charmap=UTF-8)
Shell: /bin/sh linked to /bin/dash
Init: systemd (via /run/systemd/system)
--
Antonio Terceiro <terce...@debian.org>
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index eb1753e..d8eac2e 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+ruby2.1 (2.1.5-3) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * Fix vulnerabiity with overly permissive matching of hostnames in OpenSSL
+ extension [CVE-2015-1855]
+ - applied revision 50296 of upstream svn repository.
+
+ -- Antonio Terceiro <terce...@debian.org> Fri, 17 Apr 2015 09:26:57 -0300
+
ruby2.1 (2.1.5-2) unstable; urgency=medium
* Fix Segmentation fault after pack & ioctl & unpack (Closes: #781504)
diff --git a/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb b/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb
index 43025e7..b91dce3 100644
--- a/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb
+++ b/ext/openssl/lib/openssl/ssl.rb
@@ -143,8 +143,7 @@ module OpenSSL
case san.tag
when 2 # dNSName in GeneralName (RFC5280)
should_verify_common_name = false
- reg = Regexp.escape(san.value).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+")
- return true if /\A#{reg}\z/i =~ hostname
+ return true if verify_hostname(hostname, san.value)
when 7 # iPAddress in GeneralName (RFC5280)
should_verify_common_name = false
# follows GENERAL_NAME_print() in x509v3/v3_alt.c
@@ -159,8 +158,7 @@ module OpenSSL
if should_verify_common_name
cert.subject.to_a.each{|oid, value|
if oid == "CN"
- reg = Regexp.escape(value).gsub(/\\\*/, "[^.]+")
- return true if /\A#{reg}\z/i =~ hostname
+ return true if verify_hostname(hostname, value)
end
}
end
@@ -168,11 +166,67 @@ module OpenSSL
end
module_function :verify_certificate_identity
+ def verify_hostname(hostname, san) # :nodoc:
+ # RFC 5280, IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters
+ return false unless san.ascii_only?
+ return false unless hostname.ascii_only?
+
+ # See RFC 6125, section 6.4.1
+ # Matching is case-insensitive.
+ san_parts = san.downcase.split(".")
+
+ # TODO: this behavior should probably be more strict
+ return san == hostname if san_parts.size < 2
+
+ # Matching is case-insensitive.
+ host_parts = hostname.downcase.split(".")
+
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 2.
+ # If the wildcard character is the only character of the left-most
+ # label in the presented identifier, the client SHOULD NOT compare
+ # against anything but the left-most label of the reference
+ # identifier (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
+ # not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
+ return false unless san_parts.size == host_parts.size
+
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 1.
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in
+ # which the wildcard character comprises a label other than the
+ # left-most label (e.g., do not match bar.*.example.net).
+ return false unless verify_wildcard(host_parts.shift, san_parts.shift)
+
+ san_parts.join(".") == host_parts.join(".")
+ end
+ module_function :verify_hostname
+
+ def verify_wildcard(domain_component, san_component) # :nodoc:
+ parts = san_component.split("*", -1)
+
+ return false if parts.size > 2
+ return san_component == domain_component if parts.size == 1
+
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.3, subitem 3.
+ # The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier
+ # where the wildcard character is embedded within an A-label or
+ # U-label of an internationalized domain name.
+ return false if domain_component.start_with?("xn--") && san_component != "*"
+
+ parts[0].length + parts[1].length < domain_component.length &&
+ domain_component.start_with?(parts[0]) &&
+ domain_component.end_with?(parts[1])
+ end
+ module_function :verify_wildcard
+
class SSLSocket
include Buffering
include SocketForwarder
include Nonblock
+ ##
+ # Perform hostname verification after an SSL connection is established
+ #
+ # This method MUST be called after calling #connect to ensure that the
+ # hostname of a remote peer has been verified.
def post_connection_check(hostname)
unless OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(peer_cert, hostname)
raise SSLError, "hostname \"#{hostname}\" does not match the server certificate"
diff --git a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb
index b743819..68a2543 100644
--- a/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb
+++ b/test/openssl/test_ssl.rb
@@ -359,6 +359,156 @@ class OpenSSL::TestSSL < OpenSSL::SSLTestCase
end
end
+ def test_verify_hostname
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_hostname("www.example.com", "*.example.com"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_hostname("www.subdomain.example.com", "*.example.com"))
+ end
+
+ def test_verify_wildcard
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "x*"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "foo"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "f*"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("foo", "*"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("abc*bcd", "abcd"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "x*"))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "*--qdk4b9b"))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_wildcard("xn--qdk4b9b", "xn--qdk4b9b"))
+ end
+
+ # Comments in this test is excerpted from http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#page-27
+ def test_post_connection_check_wildcard_san
+ # case-insensitive ASCII comparison
+ # RFC 6125, section 6.4.1
+ #
+ # "..matching of the reference identifier against the presented identifier
+ # is performed by comparing the set of domain name labels using a
+ # case-insensitive ASCII comparison, as clarified by [DNS-CASE] (e.g.,
+ # "WWW.Example.Com" would be lower-cased to "www.example.com" for
+ # comparison purposes)
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.Example.COM'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'WWW.Example.COM'))
+ # 1. The client SHOULD NOT attempt to match a presented identifier in
+ # which the wildcard character comprises a label other than the
+ # left-most label (e.g., do not match bar.*.example.net).
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:www.*.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ # 2. If the wildcard character is the only character of the left-most
+ # label in the presented identifier, the client SHOULD NOT compare
+ # against anything but the left-most label of the reference
+ # identifier (e.g., *.example.com would match foo.example.com but
+ # not bar.foo.example.com or example.com).
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'foo.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*.example.com'), 'bar.foo.example.com'))
+ # 3. The client MAY match a presented identifier in which the wildcard
+ # character is not the only character of the label (e.g.,
+ # baz*.example.net and *baz.example.net and b*z.example.net would
+ # be taken to match baz1.example.net and foobaz.example.net and
+ # buzz.example.net, respectively). ...
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:baz*.example.com'), 'baz1.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*baz.example.com'), 'foobaz.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:b*z.example.com'), 'buzz.example.com'))
+ # Section 6.4.3 of RFC6125 states that client should NOT match identifier
+ # where wildcard is other than left-most label.
+ #
+ # Also implicitly mentions the wildcard character only in singular form,
+ # and discourages matching against more than one wildcard.
+ #
+ # See RFC 6125, section 7.2, subitem 2.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'abc.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'ab.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:*b*.example.com'), 'bc.example.com'))
+ # ... However, the client SHOULD NOT
+ # attempt to match a presented identifier where the wildcard
+ # character is embedded within an A-label or U-label [IDNA-DEFS] of
+ # an internationalized domain name [IDNA-PROTO].
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:xn*.example.com'), 'xn1ca.example.com'))
+ # part of A-label
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:xn--*.example.com'), 'xn--1ca.example.com'))
+ # part of U-label
+ # dNSName in RFC5280 is an IA5String so U-label should NOT be allowed
+ # regardless of wildcard.
+ #
+ # See Section 7.2 of RFC 5280:
+ # IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_san('DNS:á*.example.com'), 'á1.example.com'))
+ end
+
+ def test_post_connection_check_wildcard_cn
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.Example.COM'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'WWW.Example.COM'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('www.*.com'), 'www.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'foo.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*.example.com'), 'bar.foo.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('baz*.example.com'), 'baz1.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*baz.example.com'), 'foobaz.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('b*z.example.com'), 'buzz.example.com'))
+ # Section 6.4.3 of RFC6125 states that client should NOT match identifier
+ # where wildcard is other than left-most label.
+ #
+ # Also implicitly mentions the wildcard character only in singular form,
+ # and discourages matching against more than one wildcard.
+ #
+ # See RFC 6125, section 7.2, subitem 2.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'abc.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'ab.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('*b*.example.com'), 'bc.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(true, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('xn*.example.com'), 'xn1ca.example.com'))
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('xn--*.example.com'), 'xn--1ca.example.com'))
+ # part of U-label
+ # Subject in RFC5280 states case-insensitive ASCII comparison.
+ #
+ # See Section 7.2 of RFC 5280:
+ # IA5String is limited to the set of ASCII characters.
+ assert_equal(false, OpenSSL::SSL.verify_certificate_identity(
+ create_cert_with_name('á*.example.com'), 'á1.example.com'))
+ end
+
+ def create_cert_with_san(san)
+ ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new
+ cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new
+ cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.parse("/DC=some/DC=site/CN=Some Site")
+ ext = ef.create_ext('subjectAltName', san)
+ cert.add_extension(ext)
+ cert
+ end
+
+ def create_cert_with_name(name)
+ cert = OpenSSL::X509::Certificate.new
+ cert.subject = OpenSSL::X509::Name.new([['DC', 'some'], ['DC', 'site'], ['CN', name]])
+ cert
+ end
+
+
# Create NULL byte SAN certificate
def create_null_byte_SAN_certificate(critical = false)
ef = OpenSSL::X509::ExtensionFactory.new
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
--- End Message ---
