Package: release.debian.org Severity: normal Tags: wheezy User: release.debian....@packages.debian.org Usertags: pu
Dear release team, The attached patch fixes CVE-2012-6150 and CVE-2013-4496. Please accept it for wheezy. Thanks in advance. Cheers, Ivo
diff -Nru samba-3.6.6/debian/changelog samba-3.6.6/debian/changelog --- samba-3.6.6/debian/changelog 2013-12-03 10:15:19.000000000 +0100 +++ samba-3.6.6/debian/changelog 2014-04-10 21:46:25.000000000 +0200 @@ -1,3 +1,12 @@ +samba (2:3.6.6-6+deb7u3) wheezy; urgency=medium + + * Security update + * CVE-2012-6150: pam_winbind login without require_membership_of + restrictions + * CVE-2013-4496: Password lockout not enforced for SAMR password changes + + -- Ivo De Decker <ivo.dedec...@ugent.be> Thu, 10 Apr 2014 21:37:32 +0200 + samba (2:3.6.6-6+deb7u2) wheezy-security; urgency=high * Security update diff -Nru samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2012-6150.patch samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2012-6150.patch --- samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2012-6150.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2012-6150.patch 2014-04-10 21:45:48.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ + +CVE-2012-6150: +Winbind allows for the further restriction of authenticated PAM logins using +the require_membership_of parameter. System administrators may specify a list +of SIDs or groups for which an authenticated user must be a member of. If an +authenticated user does not belong to any of the entries, then login should +fail. Invalid group name entries are ignored. + +Samba versions 3.3.10, 3.4.3, 3.5.0 and later incorrectly allow login from +authenticated users if the require_membership_of parameter specifies only +invalid group names. + +This is a vulnerability with low impact. All require_membership_of group +names must be invalid for this bug to be encountered. + + +From f62683956a3b182f6a61cc7a2b4ada2e74cde243 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Noel Power <noel.po...@suse.com> +Date: Wed, 16 Oct 2013 16:30:55 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] fail authentication for single group name which cannot be + converted to sid + +furthermore if more than one name is supplied and no sid is converted +then also fail. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10300 + +Signed-off-by: Noel Power <noel.po...@suse.com> +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: David Disseldorp <dd...@samba.org> +[dd...@samba.org: fixed incorrect bugzilla tag I added to master commit] +--- + nsswitch/pam_winbind.c | 6 ++++++ + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/nsswitch/pam_winbind.c b/nsswitch/pam_winbind.c +index 9322971..cd5e7ba 100644 +--- a/nsswitch/pam_winbind.c ++++ b/nsswitch/pam_winbind.c +@@ -1172,6 +1172,12 @@ static bool winbind_name_list_to_sid_string_list(struct pwb_context *ctx, + _make_remark_format(ctx, PAM_TEXT_INFO, _("Cannot convert group %s " + "to sid, please contact your administrator to see " + "if group %s is valid."), search_location, search_location); ++ ++ /* If no valid groups were converted we should fail outright */ ++ if (name_list != NULL && strlen(sid_list_buffer) == 0) { ++ result = false; ++ goto out; ++ } + /* + * The lookup of the last name failed.. + * It results in require_member_of_sid ends with ',' +-- +1.8.1.4 + diff -Nru samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2013-4496.patch samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2013-4496.patch --- samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2013-4496.patch 1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100 +++ samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/security-CVE-2013-4496.patch 2014-04-10 21:45:48.000000000 +0200 @@ -0,0 +1,982 @@ + ============================== + Release Notes for Samba 3.6.23 + March 11, 2014 + ============================== + +This is a security release in order to address +CVE-2013-4496 (Password lockout not enforced for SAMR password changes). + +CVE-2013-4496: +Samba versions 3.4.0 and above allow the administrator to implement +locking out Samba accounts after a number of bad password attempts. + +However, all released versions of Samba did not implement this check for +password changes, such as are available over multiple SAMR and RAP +interfaces, allowing password guessing attacks. + + + +From 25066eb31d6608075b5993b0d19b3e0843cdadeb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Bartlett <abart...@samba.org> +Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2013 14:55:44 +1300 +Subject: [PATCH 1/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3-samr: Block attempts to crack passwords + via repeated password changes + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245 + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abart...@samba.org> +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org> +Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org> +--- + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++ + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c +index 0b4b25b..59905be 100644 +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_chgpasswd.c +@@ -1106,6 +1106,8 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost, + struct samu *sampass = NULL; + NTSTATUS nt_status; + bool ret = false; ++ bool updated_badpw = false; ++ NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status; + + if (!(sampass = samu_new(NULL))) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; +@@ -1121,6 +1123,13 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost, + return NT_STATUS_NO_SUCH_USER; + } + ++ /* Quit if the account was locked out. */ ++ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) { ++ DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", user)); ++ TALLOC_FREE(sampass); ++ return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT; ++ } ++ + nt_status = check_oem_password(user, + password_encrypted_with_lm_hash, + old_lm_hash_encrypted, +@@ -1129,6 +1138,52 @@ NTSTATUS pass_oem_change(char *user, const char *rhost, + sampass, + &new_passwd); + ++ /* ++ * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not ++ * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login ++ */ ++ update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(sampass, ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)); ++ ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { ++ bool increment_bad_pw_count = false; ++ ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(nt_status, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) && ++ (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) && ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status)) ++ { ++ increment_bad_pw_count = true; ++ } ++ ++ if (increment_bad_pw_count) { ++ pdb_increment_bad_password_count(sampass); ++ updated_badpw = true; ++ } else { ++ pdb_update_bad_password_count(sampass, ++ &updated_badpw); ++ } ++ } else { ++ ++ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_NORMAL) && ++ (pdb_get_bad_password_count(sampass) > 0)){ ++ pdb_set_bad_password_count(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED); ++ pdb_set_bad_password_time(sampass, 0, PDB_CHANGED); ++ updated_badpw = true; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (updated_badpw) { ++ NTSTATUS update_status; ++ become_root(); ++ update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(sampass); ++ unbecome_root(); ++ ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) { ++ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n", ++ nt_errstr(update_status))); ++ } ++ } ++ + if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(nt_status)) { + TALLOC_FREE(sampass); + return nt_status; +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c +index 78ef1ba..3241b97 100644 +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c +@@ -1715,9 +1715,11 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + NTSTATUS status; + bool ret = false; + struct samr_user_info *uinfo; +- struct samu *pwd; ++ struct samu *pwd = NULL; + struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash; + struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd; ++ bool updated_badpw = false; ++ NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status; + + uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle, + SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL, +@@ -1729,6 +1731,15 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n", + sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid))); + ++ /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */ ++ if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present || ++ !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted || ++ !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) { ++ /* we should really handle a change with lm not ++ present */ ++ return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX; ++ } ++ + if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) { + return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; + } +@@ -1742,6 +1753,14 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; + } + ++ /* Quit if the account was locked out. */ ++ if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) { ++ DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n", ++ pdb_get_username(pwd))); ++ status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + { + const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass; + +@@ -1750,29 +1769,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + + if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) { + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto out; ++ goto update_login; + } + + memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash)); + memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash)); + } + +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */ +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present || +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted || +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) { +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not +- present */ +- status = NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX; +- goto out; +- } +- + /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */ + D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash); + D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash); + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) { + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto out; ++ goto update_login; + } + + /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */ +@@ -1780,7 +1789,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash); + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) { + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto out; ++ goto update_login; + } + + /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present +@@ -1789,7 +1798,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash); + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) { + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto out; ++ goto update_login; + } + } + +@@ -1799,7 +1808,7 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash); + if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) { + status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto out; ++ goto update_login; + } + } + +@@ -1810,6 +1819,55 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + } + + status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd); ++ ++update_login: ++ ++ /* ++ * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not ++ * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login ++ */ ++ update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd, ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)); ++ ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { ++ bool increment_bad_pw_count = false; ++ ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) && ++ (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) && ++ NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status)) ++ { ++ increment_bad_pw_count = true; ++ } ++ ++ if (increment_bad_pw_count) { ++ pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd); ++ updated_badpw = true; ++ } else { ++ pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd, ++ &updated_badpw); ++ } ++ } else { ++ ++ if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) && ++ (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){ ++ pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED); ++ pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED); ++ updated_badpw = true; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (updated_badpw) { ++ NTSTATUS update_status; ++ become_root(); ++ update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd); ++ unbecome_root(); ++ ++ if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) { ++ DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n", ++ nt_errstr(update_status))); ++ } ++ } ++ + out: + TALLOC_FREE(pwd); + +-- +1.7.9.5 + + +From 059da248cf69a3b0ef29836f49367b938fb1cbda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 14:04:20 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 2/3] CVE-2013-4496:s3:auth: fix memory leak in the + ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT case. + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245 + +Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <j...@samba.org> +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abart...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org> +--- + source3/auth/check_samsec.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c +index f918dc0..e2c42d6 100644 +--- a/source3/auth/check_samsec.c ++++ b/source3/auth/check_samsec.c +@@ -408,6 +408,7 @@ NTSTATUS check_sam_security(const DATA_BLOB *challenge, + /* Quit if the account was locked out. */ + if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(sampass) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) { + DEBUG(3,("check_sam_security: Account for user %s was locked out.\n", username)); ++ TALLOC_FREE(sampass); + return NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT; + } + +-- +1.7.9.5 + + +From 27f982ef33a1238ae48d7a38d608dd23ebde61ae Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Andrew Bartlett <abart...@samba.org> +Date: Tue, 5 Nov 2013 16:16:46 +1300 +Subject: [PATCH 3/3] CVE-2013-4496:samr: Remove ChangePasswordUser + +This old password change mechanism does not provide the plaintext to +validate against password complexity, and it is not used by modern +clients. + +The missing features in both implementations (by design) were: + + - the password complexity checks (no plaintext) + - the minimum password length (no plaintext) + +Additionally, the source3 version did not check: + + - the minimum password age + - pdb_get_pass_can_change() which checks the security + descriptor for the 'user cannot change password' setting. + - the password history + - the output of the 'passwd program' if 'unix passwd sync = yes'. + +Finally, the mechanism was almost useless, as it was incorrectly +only made available to administrative users with permission +to reset the password. It is removed here so that it is not +mistakenly reinstated in the future. + +Andrew Bartlett + +Bug: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10245 + +Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abart...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Andreas Schneider <a...@samba.org> +Reviewed-by: Stefan Metzmacher <me...@samba.org> +--- + source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c | 169 +------------------- + source3/smbd/lanman.c | 254 ------------------------------- + source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c | 126 +-------------- + source4/torture/rpc/samr.c | 12 +- + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 537 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c +index 3241b97..2519a3f 100644 +--- a/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c ++++ b/source3/rpc_server/samr/srv_samr_nt.c +@@ -1706,172 +1706,19 @@ NTSTATUS _samr_LookupNames(struct pipes_struct *p, + } + + /**************************************************************** +- _samr_ChangePasswordUser ++ _samr_ChangePasswordUser. ++ ++ So old it is just not worth implementing ++ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password ++ complexity checking and cannot update other services that use a ++ plaintext password via passwd chat/pam password change/ldap password ++ sync. + ****************************************************************/ + + NTSTATUS _samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct pipes_struct *p, + struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r) + { +- NTSTATUS status; +- bool ret = false; +- struct samr_user_info *uinfo; +- struct samu *pwd = NULL; +- struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash; +- struct samr_Password lm_pwd, nt_pwd; +- bool updated_badpw = false; +- NTSTATUS update_login_attempts_status; +- +- uinfo = policy_handle_find(p, r->in.user_handle, +- SAMR_USER_ACCESS_SET_PASSWORD, NULL, +- struct samr_user_info, &status); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- return status; +- } +- +- DEBUG(5,("_samr_ChangePasswordUser: sid:%s\n", +- sid_string_dbg(&uinfo->sid))); +- +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */ +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present || +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted || +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) { +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not +- present */ +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX; +- } +- +- if (!(pwd = samu_new(NULL))) { +- return NT_STATUS_NO_MEMORY; +- } +- +- become_root(); +- ret = pdb_getsampwsid(pwd, &uinfo->sid); +- unbecome_root(); +- +- if (!ret) { +- TALLOC_FREE(pwd); +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- } +- +- /* Quit if the account was locked out. */ +- if (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_AUTOLOCK) { +- DEBUG(3, ("Account for user %s was locked out.\n", +- pdb_get_username(pwd))); +- status = NT_STATUS_ACCOUNT_LOCKED_OUT; +- goto out; +- } +- +- { +- const uint8_t *lm_pass, *nt_pass; +- +- lm_pass = pdb_get_lanman_passwd(pwd); +- nt_pass = pdb_get_nt_passwd(pwd); +- +- if (!lm_pass || !nt_pass) { +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto update_login; +- } +- +- memcpy(&lm_pwd.hash, lm_pass, sizeof(lm_pwd.hash)); +- memcpy(&nt_pwd.hash, nt_pass, sizeof(nt_pwd.hash)); +- } +- +- /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */ +- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash); +- D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) { +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto update_login; +- } +- +- /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */ +- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash); +- D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd.hash, 16) != 0) { +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto update_login; +- } +- +- /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present +- check the nt cross hash */ +- if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross) { +- D_P16(lm_pwd.hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) { +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto update_login; +- } +- } +- +- /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present +- check the lm cross hash */ +- if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross) { +- D_P16(nt_pwd.hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) { +- status = NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- goto update_login; +- } +- } +- +- if (!pdb_set_nt_passwd(pwd, new_ntPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED) || +- !pdb_set_lanman_passwd(pwd, new_lmPwdHash.hash, PDB_CHANGED)) { +- status = NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED; +- goto out; +- } +- +- status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd); +- +-update_login: +- +- /* +- * Notify passdb backend of login success/failure. If not +- * NT_STATUS_OK the backend doesn't like the login +- */ +- update_login_attempts_status = pdb_update_login_attempts(pwd, +- NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)); +- +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- bool increment_bad_pw_count = false; +- +- if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status,NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD) && +- (pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) && +- NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_login_attempts_status)) +- { +- increment_bad_pw_count = true; +- } +- +- if (increment_bad_pw_count) { +- pdb_increment_bad_password_count(pwd); +- updated_badpw = true; +- } else { +- pdb_update_bad_password_count(pwd, +- &updated_badpw); +- } +- } else { +- +- if ((pdb_get_acct_ctrl(pwd) & ACB_NORMAL) && +- (pdb_get_bad_password_count(pwd) > 0)){ +- pdb_set_bad_password_count(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED); +- pdb_set_bad_password_time(pwd, 0, PDB_CHANGED); +- updated_badpw = true; +- } +- } +- +- if (updated_badpw) { +- NTSTATUS update_status; +- become_root(); +- update_status = pdb_update_sam_account(pwd); +- unbecome_root(); +- +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(update_status)) { +- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to modify entry: %s\n", +- nt_errstr(update_status))); +- } +- } +- +- out: +- TALLOC_FREE(pwd); +- +- return status; ++ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /******************************************************************* +diff --git a/source3/smbd/lanman.c b/source3/smbd/lanman.c +index aef12df..3b4ec65 100644 +--- a/source3/smbd/lanman.c ++++ b/source3/smbd/lanman.c +@@ -2947,259 +2947,6 @@ static bool api_NetRemoteTOD(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn, + } + + /**************************************************************************** +- Set the user password. +-*****************************************************************************/ +- +-static bool api_SetUserPassword(struct smbd_server_connection *sconn, +- connection_struct *conn,uint16 vuid, +- char *param, int tpscnt, +- char *data, int tdscnt, +- int mdrcnt,int mprcnt, +- char **rdata,char **rparam, +- int *rdata_len,int *rparam_len) +-{ +- char *np = get_safe_str_ptr(param,tpscnt,param,2); +- char *p = NULL; +- fstring user; +- fstring pass1,pass2; +- TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx = talloc_tos(); +- NTSTATUS status, result; +- struct rpc_pipe_client *cli = NULL; +- struct policy_handle connect_handle, domain_handle, user_handle; +- struct lsa_String domain_name; +- struct dom_sid2 *domain_sid; +- struct lsa_String names; +- struct samr_Ids rids; +- struct samr_Ids types; +- struct samr_Password old_lm_hash; +- struct samr_Password new_lm_hash; +- int errcode = NERR_badpass; +- uint32_t rid; +- int encrypted; +- int min_pwd_length; +- struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b = NULL; +- +- /* Skip 2 strings. */ +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,np); +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p); +- +- if (!np || !p) { +- return False; +- } +- +- /* Do we have a string ? */ +- if (skip_string(param,tpscnt,p) == NULL) { +- return False; +- } +- pull_ascii_fstring(user,p); +- +- p = skip_string(param,tpscnt,p); +- if (!p) { +- return False; +- } +- +- memset(pass1,'\0',sizeof(pass1)); +- memset(pass2,'\0',sizeof(pass2)); +- /* +- * We use 31 here not 32 as we're checking +- * the last byte we want to access is safe. +- */ +- if (!is_offset_safe(param,tpscnt,p,31)) { +- return False; +- } +- memcpy(pass1,p,16); +- memcpy(pass2,p+16,16); +- +- encrypted = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+32,0,-1); +- if (encrypted == -1) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM); +- goto out; +- } +- +- min_pwd_length = get_safe_SVAL(param,tpscnt,p+34,0,-1); +- if (min_pwd_length == -1) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM); +- goto out; +- } +- +- *rparam_len = 4; +- *rparam = smb_realloc_limit(*rparam,*rparam_len); +- if (!*rparam) { +- return False; +- } +- +- *rdata_len = 0; +- +- DEBUG(3,("Set password for <%s> (encrypted: %d, min_pwd_length: %d)\n", +- user, encrypted, min_pwd_length)); +- +- ZERO_STRUCT(connect_handle); +- ZERO_STRUCT(domain_handle); +- ZERO_STRUCT(user_handle); +- +- status = rpc_pipe_open_interface(mem_ctx, &ndr_table_samr.syntax_id, +- conn->session_info, +- &conn->sconn->client_id, +- conn->sconn->msg_ctx, +- &cli); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- DEBUG(0,("api_SetUserPassword: could not connect to samr: %s\n", +- nt_errstr(status))); +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status)); +- goto out; +- } +- +- b = cli->binding_handle; +- +- status = dcerpc_samr_Connect2(b, mem_ctx, +- global_myname(), +- SAMR_ACCESS_CONNECT_TO_SERVER | +- SAMR_ACCESS_ENUM_DOMAINS | +- SAMR_ACCESS_LOOKUP_DOMAIN, +- &connect_handle, +- &result); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status)); +- goto out; +- } +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result)); +- goto out; +- } +- +- init_lsa_String(&domain_name, get_global_sam_name()); +- +- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupDomain(b, mem_ctx, +- &connect_handle, +- &domain_name, +- &domain_sid, +- &result); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status)); +- goto out; +- } +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result)); +- goto out; +- } +- +- status = dcerpc_samr_OpenDomain(b, mem_ctx, +- &connect_handle, +- SAMR_DOMAIN_ACCESS_OPEN_ACCOUNT, +- domain_sid, +- &domain_handle, +- &result); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status)); +- goto out; +- } +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result)); +- goto out; +- } +- +- init_lsa_String(&names, user); +- +- status = dcerpc_samr_LookupNames(b, mem_ctx, +- &domain_handle, +- 1, +- &names, +- &rids, +- &types, +- &result); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status)); +- goto out; +- } +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result)); +- goto out; +- } +- +- if (rids.count != 1) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_NO_SUCH_USER); +- goto out; +- } +- if (rids.count != types.count) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM); +- goto out; +- } +- if (types.ids[0] != SID_NAME_USER) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(WERR_INVALID_PARAM); +- goto out; +- } +- +- rid = rids.ids[0]; +- +- status = dcerpc_samr_OpenUser(b, mem_ctx, +- &domain_handle, +- SAMR_USER_ACCESS_CHANGE_PASSWORD, +- rid, +- &user_handle, +- &result); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status)); +- goto out; +- } +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result)); +- goto out; +- } +- +- if (encrypted == 0) { +- E_deshash(pass1, old_lm_hash.hash); +- E_deshash(pass2, new_lm_hash.hash); +- } else { +- ZERO_STRUCT(old_lm_hash); +- ZERO_STRUCT(new_lm_hash); +- memcpy(old_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass1), 16)); +- memcpy(new_lm_hash.hash, pass1, MIN(strlen(pass2), 16)); +- } +- +- status = dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser(b, mem_ctx, +- &user_handle, +- true, /* lm_present */ +- &old_lm_hash, +- &new_lm_hash, +- false, /* nt_present */ +- NULL, /* old_nt_crypted */ +- NULL, /* new_nt_crypted */ +- false, /* cross1_present */ +- NULL, /* nt_cross */ +- false, /* cross2_present */ +- NULL, /* lm_cross */ +- &result); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(status)); +- goto out; +- } +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(result)) { +- errcode = W_ERROR_V(ntstatus_to_werror(result)); +- goto out; +- } +- +- errcode = NERR_Success; +- out: +- +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&user_handle)) { +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &user_handle, &result); +- } +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&domain_handle)) { +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &domain_handle, &result); +- } +- if (b && is_valid_policy_hnd(&connect_handle)) { +- dcerpc_samr_Close(b, mem_ctx, &connect_handle, &result); +- } +- +- memset((char *)pass1,'\0',sizeof(fstring)); +- memset((char *)pass2,'\0',sizeof(fstring)); +- +- SSVAL(*rparam,0,errcode); +- SSVAL(*rparam,2,0); /* converter word */ +- return(True); +-} +- +-/**************************************************************************** + Set the user password (SamOEM version - gets plaintext). + ****************************************************************************/ + +@@ -5790,7 +5537,6 @@ static const struct { + {"NetServerEnum2", RAP_NetServerEnum2, api_RNetServerEnum2}, /* anon OK */ + {"NetServerEnum3", RAP_NetServerEnum3, api_RNetServerEnum3}, /* anon OK */ + {"WAccessGetUserPerms",RAP_WAccessGetUserPerms,api_WAccessGetUserPerms}, +- {"SetUserPassword", RAP_WUserPasswordSet2, api_SetUserPassword}, + {"WWkstaUserLogon", RAP_WWkstaUserLogon, api_WWkstaUserLogon}, + {"PrintJobInfo", RAP_WPrintJobSetInfo, api_PrintJobInfo}, + {"WPrintDriverEnum", RAP_WPrintDriverEnum, api_WPrintDriverEnum}, +diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c +index ee13a11..e618740 100644 +--- a/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c ++++ b/source4/rpc_server/samr/samr_password.c +@@ -32,131 +32,17 @@ + + /* + samr_ChangePasswordUser ++ ++ So old it is just not worth implementing ++ because it does not supply a plaintext and so we can't do password ++ complexity checking and cannot update all the other password hashes. ++ + */ + NTSTATUS dcesrv_samr_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_call, + TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, + struct samr_ChangePasswordUser *r) + { +- struct dcesrv_handle *h; +- struct samr_account_state *a_state; +- struct ldb_context *sam_ctx; +- struct ldb_message **res; +- int ret; +- struct samr_Password new_lmPwdHash, new_ntPwdHash, checkHash; +- struct samr_Password *lm_pwd, *nt_pwd; +- NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_OK; +- const char * const attrs[] = { "dBCSPwd", "unicodePwd" , NULL }; +- +- DCESRV_PULL_HANDLE(h, r->in.user_handle, SAMR_HANDLE_USER); +- +- a_state = h->data; +- +- /* basic sanity checking on parameters. Do this before any database ops */ +- if (!r->in.lm_present || !r->in.nt_present || +- !r->in.old_lm_crypted || !r->in.new_lm_crypted || +- !r->in.old_nt_crypted || !r->in.new_nt_crypted) { +- /* we should really handle a change with lm not +- present */ +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER_MIX; +- } +- +- /* Connect to a SAMDB with system privileges for fetching the old pw +- * hashes. */ +- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx, +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, +- system_session(dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx), 0); +- if (sam_ctx == NULL) { +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; +- } +- +- /* fetch the old hashes */ +- ret = gendb_search_dn(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, +- a_state->account_dn, &res, attrs); +- if (ret != 1) { +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- } +- +- status = samdb_result_passwords(mem_ctx, +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, +- res[0], &lm_pwd, &nt_pwd); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status) || !nt_pwd) { +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- } +- +- /* decrypt and check the new lm hash */ +- if (lm_pwd) { +- D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.new_lm_crypted->hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash); +- D_P16(new_lmPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_lm_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, lm_pwd, 16) != 0) { +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- } +- } +- +- /* decrypt and check the new nt hash */ +- D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.new_nt_crypted->hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash); +- D_P16(new_ntPwdHash.hash, r->in.old_nt_crypted->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, nt_pwd, 16) != 0) { +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- } +- +- /* The NT Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present +- check the nt cross hash */ +- if (r->in.cross1_present && r->in.nt_cross && lm_pwd) { +- D_P16(lm_pwd->hash, r->in.nt_cross->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_ntPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) { +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- } +- } +- +- /* The LM Cross is not required by Win2k3 R2, but if present +- check the lm cross hash */ +- if (r->in.cross2_present && r->in.lm_cross && lm_pwd) { +- D_P16(nt_pwd->hash, r->in.lm_cross->hash, checkHash.hash); +- if (memcmp(checkHash.hash, new_lmPwdHash.hash, 16) != 0) { +- return NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD; +- } +- } +- +- /* Start a SAM with user privileges for the password change */ +- sam_ctx = samdb_connect(mem_ctx, dce_call->event_ctx, +- dce_call->conn->dce_ctx->lp_ctx, +- dce_call->conn->auth_state.session_info, 0); +- if (sam_ctx == NULL) { +- return NT_STATUS_INVALID_SYSTEM_SERVICE; +- } +- +- /* Start transaction */ +- ret = ldb_transaction_start(sam_ctx); +- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG(1, ("Failed to start transaction: %s\n", ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); +- return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED; +- } +- +- /* Performs the password modification. We pass the old hashes read out +- * from the database since they were already checked against the user- +- * provided ones. */ +- status = samdb_set_password(sam_ctx, mem_ctx, +- a_state->account_dn, +- a_state->domain_state->domain_dn, +- NULL, &new_lmPwdHash, &new_ntPwdHash, +- lm_pwd, nt_pwd, /* this is a user password change */ +- NULL, +- NULL); +- if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) { +- ldb_transaction_cancel(sam_ctx); +- return status; +- } +- +- /* And this confirms it in a transaction commit */ +- ret = ldb_transaction_commit(sam_ctx); +- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) { +- DEBUG(1,("Failed to commit transaction to change password on %s: %s\n", +- ldb_dn_get_linearized(a_state->account_dn), +- ldb_errstring(sam_ctx))); +- return NT_STATUS_TRANSACTION_ABORTED; +- } +- +- return NT_STATUS_OK; ++ return NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; + } + + /* +diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c +index 7d9a1e2..adfc5d4 100644 +--- a/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c ++++ b/source4/torture/rpc/samr.c +@@ -1728,8 +1728,16 @@ static bool test_ChangePasswordUser(struct dcerpc_binding_handle *b, + + torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, dcerpc_samr_ChangePasswordUser_r(b, tctx, &r), + "ChangePasswordUser failed"); +- torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD, +- "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash"); ++ ++ /* Do not proceed if this call has been removed */ ++ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED)) { ++ return true; ++ } ++ ++ if (!NT_STATUS_EQUAL(r.out.result, NT_STATUS_PASSWORD_RESTRICTION)) { ++ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, r.out.result, NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD, ++ "ChangePasswordUser failed: expected NT_STATUS_WRONG_PASSWORD because we broke the LM hash"); ++ } + + /* Unbreak the LM hash */ + hash1.hash[0]--; +-- +1.7.9.5 + diff -Nru samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/series samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/series --- samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/series 2013-12-03 10:15:19.000000000 +0100 +++ samba-3.6.6/debian/patches/series 2014-04-10 21:45:48.000000000 +0200 @@ -27,3 +27,5 @@ security-CVE-2013-4124.patch security-CVE-2013-4475.patch security-CVE-2013-4408.patch +security-CVE-2012-6150.patch +security-CVE-2013-4496.patch
