Hi Russ, I'm delighted to hear from you. I was hoping to.
At 2025-04-09T11:31:24-0700, Russ Allbery wrote: > I am not the project secretary, just one random developer, but for > whatever it's worth, I think this interpretation of the constitution > is incorrect and the TC does not have the ability to override a > delegate. Acknowledged. > The main weight of your argument seems to rest on a (to me) novel > interpretation that the order in which bodies are listed in section 2 > is normative, not informative. Yes, but the list _is_ in upright rather than slanted text, making it normative per Appendix B, and its ordering _is_ given significance. > This seems clearly incorrect given the plain wording of the subsequent > paragraph, which does not say the order is significant, only that it > is informative. I did consider this possibility. I think that reading reinterprets "informative", as applied to that paragraph, as "meaningless". While I'm most familiar with the U.S. legal tradition,[1] as far as I'm aware most interpretive practices in the world strive to avoid nullifying the meaning of deliberately drafted text (contrast scrivener's errors and similar). > The normative text says that overrides will be explicitly noted: > > The powers of a person or body may be subject to review and/or > limitation by others; in this case the reviewing body or person's > entry will state this. True. > The clear implication is that if the entry does *not* state this, then > the powers are *not* subject to review by that body or person. ...in that case, what's the point of the text you quote next? > The non-normative text then elaborates (emphasis mine): > > In the list above, a person or body is *usually* listed before any > people or bodies whose decisions they can overrule or who they > (help) appoint - *but not everyone listed earlier can overrule > everyone listed later.* I think you have reinterpreted the aforementioned normative sentence of §2 in a way that _nullifies_ the informative text. If you're right, then the informative text can be _deleted_ since the normative sentence exhausts all possibilities: review and/or limitation of the exercise of any power is strictly limited to express statement; the order of the list is immaterial and ultimately superfluous. > I think it's much clearer and simpler to note that the TC has a list > of specifically enumerated powers in section 6.1 and overriding > Project Delegates is not one of them. I agree that your interpretation is simpler, and likely relieves the TC of having to worry about certain headaches, like the (unlikely?) nightmare scenario in my footnote 2 from the start of the thread. https://lists.debian.org/debian-vote/2025/04/msg00087.html However, the simpler interpretation may not be the more faithful one to the _complete text_ of the Debian Constitution, and moreover it may be less administratively prudent. I appreciate that the TC has striven to avoid resembling an appellate court of general jurisdiction (meaning that it has discretion to hear any subject matter brought before it), but that preference may more tightly constrain its role than the drafters and ratifiers envisioned--said ratification being a whisker before my time, I'm afraid, but I'm sure everyone was aware of the principle of checks and balances. The views of today's body of Developers are important too. But if there's one thing Americans have learned about our hoary old Constitution with its Germanic capitalizations and long ſs, it's that the more ossified you let the language of the document get, the weirder the meanings people manage to find in it ("a well regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free State" being notorious). As I noted before, the proper remedy for a clash between a consensus textual reading of the Constitution and a consensus preference for administration of the powers and responsibilities it allocates is the amendment process. It is not to tell new Developers that they need special interpretive lenses with which to read the Constitution to avoid naïve errors. > The TC can override Developers, as you quoted, but I would interpret > that to mean Individual Developers (i.e., section 3), and the > constitution clearly puts Project Delegates in a separate category > (section 8). I don't perceive the sharp distinction you do, because §8 also says that Delegates are empowered (as is the DPL, by explicit reference) to "designat[e] people as Developers who do not maintain packages". This text doesn't quite come out and say that no person may serve as a Delegate who is not a Developer, but it does imply that such a restriction would be pointless because the DPL is empowered to designate whomever they please as a Delegate _and_ as a Developer, and the text is forthright that the latter power can itself be delegated--not a surprise, that's the sustaining principle of the Debian Account Managers (DAM) team, and maybe to an extent the New Maintainers Front Desk too. Consider that your interpretation could mean that the DPL can with a single proclamation immunize _all_ Developers from override by the Technical Committee by issuing them a delegation coextensive with whatever their current powers are (§3.1.1 most significantly). I am reminded of the process the U.K. House of Commons has developed for handling a resignation, which is technically impossible or even illegal; they instead appoint the Member of Parliament to the office of Steward and Bailiff of the Chiltern Hundreds, disqualifying them from office.[2] Whoosh. No more overrides of Developers by the TC. If the DPL had it in for the TC, then under your reading this stratagem is available to them. > Compare to 4.1.3, which says quite explicitly that a GR can override > the DPL or Project Delegates. I agree; that override power is clear. > This language is conspicuously absent from the list of powers of the > TC, _Only_ if you classify Delegates as, in some sense, not Developers. > and I believe that should be read normatively. I hear you. I'm simply unconvinced of your reading and moreover of its prudence as a governing principle under a Constitution that strives to avoid the accumulation of power, by anyone, without accountability. But, like you, I'm just a guy. I have no special interpretive powers. > Obviously Kurt has the final say, but if he were to ask me my opinion, > that's what I'd tell him. Acknowledged. I vigorously support your right to interpret the Debian Constitution for yourself and advocate that interpretation to the Project Secretary. Regards, Branden [1] https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/a-dozen-canons-of-statutory-and-constitutional-text-construction/ [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Resignation_from_the_House_of_Commons_of_the_United_Kingdom
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