On 9/14/05, Steve Langasek <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 14, 2005 at 01:14:21AM +0200, Alexander Terekhov wrote:
>
> > "However, nothing else grants you permission to modify or
> > distribute the Program or its derivative works."
>
> > That may be true in the GNU Republic.
>
> > Exclusive distribution right is about copies (material objects),
> > not works.
>
> Contrary to popular belief, this list does not exist to serve as a safe
> haven for the legally delusional.
And who's "legally delusional"? Start with 17 USC 101.
"Copies" are material objects.
"Works" are intangible things fixed in "copies." Fixation of work in
a material object (brains and retinas aside for a moment) produces
exact copy of that work.
Got it? Now read 17 USC 106(3) and 109. Next we can talk about static
linking and 117 ("... Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the
provisions of this section may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred,
along with the copy from which such copies were prepared, only as part
of the lease, sale, ...") and downloading (I mean lawfully made copies
"from which such copies were prepared" -- see above).
< quotes from dmca/sec-104-report-vol-<2|3>.pdf >
Red Hat, Inc.:
Let me just clarify that I don't think anyone today intends to
impact our licensing practices. I haven't seen anything in the
comments, nor have I heard anything today that makes me think
someone does have that intention. What we're concerned about
are unintended consequences of any amendments to Section 109.
The primary difference between digital and nondigital products
with respect to Section 109 is that the former are frequently
licensed. ... product is also available for free downloaded
from the Internet without the printed documentation, without
the box, and without the installation service. Many open source
and free software products also embody the concept of copyleft.
... We are asking that amendments not be recommended that would
jeopardize the ability of open source and free software
licensor to require [blah blah]
Time Warner, Inc.:
We note that the initial downloading of a copy, from an
authorized source to a purchaser's computer, can result in
lawful ownership of a copy stored in a tangible medium.
Library Associations:
First, as conceded by Time Warner, digital transmissions can
result in the fixation of a tangible copy. By intentionally
engaging in digital transmissions with the awareness that a
tangible copy is made on the recipient's computer, copyright
owners are indeed transferring ownership of a copy of the work
to lawful recipients. Second, the position advanced by Time
Warner and the Copyright Industry Organizations is premised
on a formalistic reading of a particular codification of the
first sale doctrine. When technological change renders the
literal meaning of a statutory provision ambiguous, that
provision "must be construed in light of its basic purpose"
and "should not be so narrowly construed as to permit evasion
because of changing habits due to new inventions and
discoveries." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S.
151, 156-158 (1975). The basic purpose of the first sale
doctrine is to facilitate the continued flow of property
throughout society.
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/reply/Reply008.pdf
regards,
alexander.
