Source: linux Version: 6.1.12-1 Severity: wishlist Tags: patch, sid X-Debbugs-Cc: miguel.bernal.ma...@linux.intel.com, jair.de.jesus.gonzalez.plascen...@linux.intel.com
Dear Maintainer, Please enable the Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) Guest driver. Intel’s Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect confidential guest VMs from the host and physical attacks by isolating the guest register state and by encrypting the guest memory. In TDX, a special module running in a special mode sits between the host and the guest and manages the guest/host separation [2]. Since the host cannot directly access guest registers or memory, much normal functionality of a hypervisor must be moved into the guest. This is implemented using a Virtualization Exception (#VE) that is handled by the guest kernel. A #VE is handled entirely inside the guest kernel, but some require the hypervisor to be consulted. TDX includes new hypercall-like mechanisms for communicating from the guest to the hypervisor or the TDX module. Intel® Trust Domain Extensions (Intel® TDX) is introducing new, architectural elements to help deploy hardware-isolated, virtual machines (VMs) called trust domains (TDs). Intel TDX is designed to isolate VMs from the virtual-machine manager (VMM)/hypervisor and any other non-TD software on the platform to protect TDs from a broad range of software [1]. These hardware-isolated TDs include: * Secure-Arbitration Mode (SEAM) – a new mode of the CPU designed to host an Intel-provided, digitally-signed, security-services module called the Intel TDX module. * Shared bit in GPA to help allow TD to access shared memory. * Secure EPT to help translate private GPA to provide address-translation integrity and to prevent TD-code fetches from shared memory. Encryption and integrity protection of private-memory access using a TD-private key is the goal. * Physical-address-metadata table (PAMT) to help track page allocation, page initialization, and TLB consistency. * Multi-key, total-memory-encryption (MKTME) engine designed to provide memory encryption using AES-128- XTS and integrity using 28-bit MAC and a TD-ownership bit. * Remote attestation designed to provide evidence of TD executing on a genuine, Intel TDX system and its TCB version. [1] https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html [2] https://docs.kernel.org/x86/tdx.html A MR was created at: https://salsa.debian.org/kernel-team/linux/-/merge_requests/671 Thanks, Miguel
