Ben Caradoc-Davies <b...@transient.nz> writes: > On 20/07/15 12:18, Ian Jackson wrote:
>> You're talking as if what is identified is a human being. But of >> course, it isn't. When you do a git push (or whatever) what is pushed >> is controlled by the computer you are using. > Of course. Humans lack a network interface. Authentication is the > process whereby humans use tools they control to prove their > identity. The integrity of these tools, the degree of control, and the > care with which these tools are used appears to be your concern. Er, you're responding to Ian as if you've never before heard of the concept of using separate authentication credentials for different purposes, but this is a very old and respected technique and a standard security approach. It's a form of privilege separation and roles? Consider, for example, having entirely separate work and personal computing hardware with separate keys. (I highly recommend anyone who isn't self-employed do the latter, btw. It keeps things much simpler, particularly if you change employers.) I wouldn't care that there is only one GitHub account if I was able to designate separate keys for different purposes and control which of them can commit to which repositories. That way, systems can be kept isolated from each other and not have credentials to commit to repositories that are inappropriate for that system. There are some repositories that I would want to treat with a much higher level of care and only allow access from specific hosts. > What is your concern? That your workstation might be misused or > compromised by someone in your workplace? Key logger? Remote access > snooping? And that this compromise might be used for malicious purposes > against Debian? Yes, all those things, and innumerable other ways of attacking hosts. > GitHub recommend using SSH key passphrases, which provide a degree of > protection against machine compromise: > https://help.github.com/articles/working-with-ssh-key-passphrases/ Which protects only against a tiny fraction of those attacks. -- Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org) <http://www.eyrie.org/~eagle/> -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-devel-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: https://lists.debian.org/87si8jbkzy....@hope.eyrie.org
