On 5/11/05, Peter Samuelson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > The GPL did not use the word "equals". > > Neither "that is to say" nor "namely" are equal to "equals". > > Are we to understand that your argument hinges on such fine semantic > distinctions as claiming that "that is to say" does not connote > equivalency? Have you nothing better with which to prop up your point > of view?
I'm disputing an argument which seems to require a number of such fine points. It is difficult for me to raise such disputes without mentioning the the points themselves. However, I can present my point of view without resorting to this argument: Let's say that we have a court case which involves some contested GPLed work. How should we proceed? First, let's consider a work which doesn't have any binaries. This would be no different from any other copyright case -- you have to show that the work in question is copyrighted under the GPL, and you'd have to show that the terms of the GPL are being violated. This should be relatively simple, and we can neglect sections 2 and 3 (which are clearly being complied with if the rest of the license is being followed). Now let's imagine that we've got a case which involves binaries. What do we have to do? First, we need exhibits: the sources, and the binaries. Out of consideration for the court, we want to pick examples which are as simple as possible while representing all of the important contested issues. So let's imagine we have Exhibit A (the sources) and Exhibit B (the binary). [We need to also show that this binary is representative of something which is being distributed, but that's not really different from what you have to do in other copyright cases, so I'll ignore that part.] Second, we need to show that Exhibit B is derived from Exhibit A. Again, we want to present this in a simple and easily understandable form, and we want to also present complete information. Once we've shown that B is derived from A, we can start examining the terms of the GPL to make sure that they are being followed. For example, let's say now that we're the defending party, and we want to show that the mere aggregation clause applies. To do this, we would show that the disputed work could be replaced by something trivial, and that having done so, the program is still the same program -- we might do this by showing that it still has the same behavior. Switching sides again, if someone asserted that the mere aggregation clause applied, and used program behavior to make that assertion, and I believed that mere aggregation did not apply, I would show how the program failed to operate in some independent context, with the disputed section removed. Is that clear enough? Now, back to the argument: an argument has been raised that the GPL is flawed because a "work based on the Program" defined in two parts, where the first part asserts that "work based on the Program" is a derivative work. The assertion has been made that the second part of that definition is meaningless. Let's assume that this assertion is true, that the second part of that definition is meaningless. Let's further assume that I can construct an example case where a work isn't covered by the GPL because the second part of that definition is meaningless. What would that mean? Since Section 0 says that the GPL grants you license to distribute this work, and since there's no part of the GPL that grants you license where Section 0 does not apply, in our hypothetical case we would have shown that the GPL does not grant you license to distribute this work. At this point, either: A) Copyright law doesn't apply, so it doesn't matter that you don't have license, or B) The GPL doesn't apply, so it doesn't matter that the GPL doesn't grant you license, of C) Distributing the work is prohibited by law. My argument is that if you reach C) by ignoring the second half of the definition of "work based on the Program", that you're doing something wrong. Does that make sense? -- Raul
