Hi, since this package has been NMUd since 2 years I am going to 0-day NMU this vulnerability. The attached patch fixes CVE-2007-5034.
It will be also archived on: http://people.debian.org/~nion/nmu-diff/elinks-0.11.1-1.4_0.11.1-1.5.patch Kind regards Nico -- Nico Golde - http://ngolde.de - [EMAIL PROTECTED] - GPG: 0x73647CFF For security reasons, all text in this mail is double-rot13 encrypted.
diff -u elinks-0.11.1/debian/changelog elinks-0.11.1/debian/changelog
--- elinks-0.11.1/debian/changelog
+++ elinks-0.11.1/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+elinks (0.11.1-1.5) unstable; urgency=high
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload by testing security team.
+ * Fixed bug in http.c which could lead to secret information disclosure
+ via POST requests for https URLs (CVE-2007-5034) (Closes: #443914, #443891).
+
+ -- Nico Golde <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Tue, 25 Sep 2007 13:31:18 +0200
+
elinks (0.11.1-1.4) unstable; urgency=high
* Non-maintainer security upload.
only in patch2:
unchanged:
--- elinks-0.11.1.orig/src/protocol/http/http.c
+++ elinks-0.11.1/src/protocol/http/http.c
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@
int trace = get_opt_bool("protocol.http.trace");
struct string header;
unsigned char *post_data = NULL;
- struct auth_entry *entry;
+ struct auth_entry *entry = NULL;
struct uri *uri = conn->proxied_uri; /* Set to the real uri */
unsigned char *optstr;
int use_connect, talking_to_proxy;
@@ -577,6 +577,11 @@
add_to_string(&header, "TRACE ");
} else if (use_connect) {
add_to_string(&header, "CONNECT ");
+ /* In CONNECT requests, we send only a subset of the
+ * headers to the proxy. See the "CONNECT:" comments
+ * below. After the CONNECT request succeeds, we
+ * negotiate TLS with the real server and make a new
+ * HTTP request that includes all the headers. */
} else if (uri->post) {
add_to_string(&header, "POST ");
conn->unrestartable = 1;
@@ -609,10 +614,14 @@
add_long_to_string(&header, http->sent_version.minor);
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
+ /* CONNECT: Sending a Host header seems pointless as the same
+ * information is already in the CONNECT line. It's harmless
+ * though and Mozilla does it too. */
add_to_string(&header, "Host: ");
add_uri_to_string(&header, uri, URI_HTTP_HOST);
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
+ /* CONNECT: Proxy-Authorization is intended to be seen by the proxy. */
if (talking_to_proxy) {
unsigned char *user = get_opt_str("protocol.http.proxy.user");
unsigned char *passwd = get_opt_str("protocol.http.proxy.passwd");
@@ -660,6 +669,11 @@
}
}
+ /* CONNECT: User-Agent does not reveal anything about the
+ * resource we're fetching, and it may help the proxy return
+ * better error messages. */
+ optstr = get_opt_str("protocol.http.user_agent");
+
optstr = get_opt_str("protocol.http.user_agent");
if (*optstr && strcmp(optstr, " ")) {
unsigned char *ustr, ts[64] = "";
@@ -685,33 +699,48 @@
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
}
- switch (get_opt_int("protocol.http.referer.policy")) {
- case REFERER_NONE:
- /* oh well */
- break;
+ /* CONNECT: Referer probably is a secret page in the HTTPS
+ * server, so don't reveal it to the proxy. */
+ if (!use_connect) {
+ switch (get_opt_int("protocol.http.referer.policy")) {
+ case REFERER_NONE:
+ /* oh well */
+ break;
- case REFERER_FAKE:
- optstr = get_opt_str("protocol.http.referer.fake");
- if (!optstr[0]) break;
- add_to_string(&header, "Referer: ");
- add_to_string(&header, optstr);
- add_crlf_to_string(&header);
- break;
+ case REFERER_FAKE:
+ optstr = get_opt_str("protocol.http.referer.fake");
+ if (!optstr[0]) break;
+ add_to_string(&header, "Referer: ");
+ add_to_string(&header, optstr);
+ add_crlf_to_string(&header);
+ break;
- case REFERER_TRUE:
- if (!conn->referrer) break;
- add_to_string(&header, "Referer: ");
- add_url_to_http_string(&header, conn->referrer, URI_HTTP_REFERRER);
- add_crlf_to_string(&header);
- break;
+ case REFERER_TRUE:
+ if (!conn->referrer) break;
+ add_to_string(&header, "Referer: ");
+ add_url_to_http_string(&header, conn->referrer, URI_HTTP_REFERRER);
+ add_crlf_to_string(&header);
+ break;
- case REFERER_SAME_URL:
- add_to_string(&header, "Referer: ");
- add_url_to_http_string(&header, uri, URI_HTTP_REFERRER);
- add_crlf_to_string(&header);
- break;
+ case REFERER_SAME_URL:
+ add_to_string(&header, "Referer: ");
+ add_url_to_http_string(&header, uri, URI_HTTP_REFERRER);
+ add_crlf_to_string(&header);
+ break;
+ }
}
+ /* CONNECT: Do send all Accept* headers to the CONNECT proxy,
+ * because they do not reveal anything about the resource
+ * we're going to request via TLS, and they may affect the
+ * error message if the CONNECT request fails.
+ *
+ * If ELinks is ever changed to vary its Accept headers based
+ * on what it intends to do with the returned resource, e.g.
+ * sending "Accept: text/css" when it wants an external
+ * stylesheet, then it should do that only in the inner GET
+ * and not in the outer CONNECT. */
+
add_to_string(&header, "Accept: */*");
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
@@ -766,6 +795,11 @@
}
#endif
+ /* CONNECT: Proxy-Connection is intended to be seen by the
+ * proxy. If the CONNECT request succeeds, then the proxy
+ * will forward the remainder of the TCP connection to the
+ * origin server, and Proxy-Connection does not matter; but
+ * if the request fails, then Proxy-Connection may matter. */
/* FIXME: What about post-HTTP/1.1?? --Zas */
if (HTTP_1_1(http->sent_version)) {
if (!IS_PROXY_URI(conn->uri)) {
@@ -782,7 +816,9 @@
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
}
- if (conn->cached) {
+ /* CONNECT: Do not tell the proxy anything we have cached
+ * about the resource. */
+ if (!use_connect && conn->cached) {
if (!conn->cached->incomplete && conn->cached->head && conn->cached->last_modified
&& conn->cache_mode <= CACHE_MODE_CHECK_IF_MODIFIED) {
add_to_string(&header, "If-Modified-Since: ");
@@ -791,6 +827,8 @@
}
}
+ /* CONNECT: Let's send cache control headers to the proxy too;
+ * they may affect DNS caching. */
if (conn->cache_mode >= CACHE_MODE_FORCE_RELOAD) {
add_to_string(&header, "Pragma: no-cache");
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
@@ -798,7 +836,9 @@
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
}
- if (conn->from || conn->progress->start > 0) {
+ /* CONNECT: Do not reveal byte ranges to the proxy. It can't
+ * do anything good with that information anyway. */
+ if (!use_connect && (conn->from || conn->progress->start > 0)) {
/* conn->from takes precedence. conn->progress.start is set only the first
* time, then conn->from gets updated and in case of any retries
* etc we have everything interesting in conn->from already. */
@@ -808,7 +848,11 @@
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
}
- entry = find_auth(uri);
+ /* CONNECT: The Authorization header is for the origin server only. */
+ if (!use_connect) {
+ entry = find_auth(uri);
+ }
+
if (entry) {
if (entry->digest) {
unsigned char *response;
@@ -848,7 +892,8 @@
}
}
- if (uri->post) {
+ /* CONNECT: Any POST data is for the origin server only. */
+ if (!use_connect && uri->post) {
/* We search for first '\n' in uri->post to get content type
* as set by get_form_uri(). This '\n' is dropped if any
* and replaced by correct '\r\n' termination here. */
@@ -867,7 +912,9 @@
}
#ifdef CONFIG_COOKIES
- {
+ /* CONNECT: Cookies are for the origin server only. */
+ if (!use_connect) {
+
struct string *cookies = send_cookies(uri);
if (cookies) {
@@ -882,11 +929,18 @@
add_crlf_to_string(&header);
if (post_data) {
+
+ /* CONNECT: Any POST data is for the origin server only.
+ * This was already checked above and post_data is NULL
+ * in that case. Verified with an assertion below. */
+
#define POST_BUFFER_SIZE 4096
unsigned char *post = post_data;
unsigned char buffer[POST_BUFFER_SIZE];
int n = 0;
+ assert(!use_connect); /* see comment above */
+
while (post[0] && post[1]) {
int h1, h2;
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