On Thu, Jul 05, 2007 at 03:55:03PM -0700, Russ Allbery wrote:
> Andrew Reid <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> 
> >   I've had a chance to experiment a little more, and it's
> > clear that what is crashing the kadmind is a second or
> > subsequent kpasswd attempt for a given principal a short
> > time after a (successful) first change.
> 
> >   It's as though there's some time window after a kpasswd
> > invocation on a principal during which additional kpasswd
> > invocations will crash the server's admin daemon.  It
> > seems to be independent of the particular principal or
> > client machine.
> 
> Apologies for the delay in responding to this bug report.
> 
> The next step would be to see if you can get a core dump from kadmind so
> that we can figure out just where it's dying.  Unfortunately the syslog
> messages don't help much there.  Can you make sure that core dumps are
> enabled and core dump size is unlimited (with ulimit -c unlimited) and
> restart kadmind to try to get a core dump from the next time this happens?

  Thanks for the reply.

  I got a backtrace.  I ran "kadmind -nofork" in a terminal
session (after killing the regular daemon, of course), and triggered
the segfault by the already-described client password-change 
mechanism.  

  The gdb-provided backtrace is:

> #0  0x00002b1052c1c5d0 in strlen () from /lib/libc.so.6
> #1  0x000000000040aa3c in ?? ()
> #2  0x000000000040ab3f in ?? ()
> #3  0x000000000040a783 in ?? ()
> #4  0x00000000004084b2 in ?? ()
> #5  0x0000000000408b5e in ?? ()
> #6  0x0000000000409a7e in ?? ()
> #7  0x00002b1052bc64ca in __libc_start_main () from /lib/libc.so.6
> #8  0x0000000000403dca in ?? ()
> #9  0x00007fff58a4f6c8 in ?? ()
> #10 0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()

  I actually did this twice, since it's not possible, using the
syslog, to distinguish between a randomly-located segfault
(due to pointer-mishandling, for instance) and differences due
to relocation or other invocation-dependent differences.  I got
the same backtrace both times.

  The fact that the segfault was triggered also means that
the bug is still present in the current etch security-fix
package, krb5-admin-server-1.4.4-7etch2, which is now installed
on this server.  It was ...-7etch1 which first showed the 
bug.

                                -- A.
-- 
Dr. Andrew C. E. Reid, Guest Researcher 
Center for Theoretical and Computational Materials Science
National Institute of Standards and Technology, Mail Stop 8910
Gaithersburg MD 20899 USA
[EMAIL PROTECTED]


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