Source: python-cryptography
Version: 47.0.0-1
Severity: important
Tags: security upstream
X-Debbugs-Cc: [email protected], Debian Security Team <[email protected]>

Hi,

The following vulnerability was published for python-cryptography.

CVE-2026-69247[0]:
| cryptography is a package designed to expose cryptographic
| primitives and recipes to Python developers. From 44.0.0 until
| 50.0.0, pkcs7_decrypt_der, pkcs7_decrypt_pem, and
| pkcs7_decrypt_smime reported the outcome of decrypting a
| RecipientInfo's encryptedKey in several distinguishable ways, one of
| which disclosed the exact length recovered from the RSA operation.
| The same distinction was also observable by timing. An application
| that decrypts attacker-supplied EnvelopedData and reflects the
| outcome gives the attacker a Bleichenbacher oracle against the
| content-encryption key. Decryption ran as RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decrypt of
| encryptedKey, build an AES cipher from the result, then AES-CBC
| decrypt and PKCS#7 unpad. Invalid RSA padding, a valid padding with
| a bad key length, a correct length with a wrong key, and the real
| key each failed or succeeded differently. Case 1 is reachable only
| where the linked library lacks implicit rejection: OpenSSL 3.0 and
| 3.1, LibreSSL, and BoringSSL. Exploitation requires a service that
| auto-decrypts untrusted EnvelopedData matching the victim
| certificate and answers adaptively at high volume, such as an S/MIME
| gateway or mail filter. This issue is fixed in 50.0.0.


If you fix the vulnerability please also make sure to include the
CVE (Common Vulnerabilities & Exposures) id in your changelog entry.

For further information see:

[0] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-69247
    https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-69247
[1] https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/security/advisories/GHSA-g6cj-pr64-35w5
[2] https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/pull/15369
[3] 
https://github.com/pyca/cryptography/commit/53fccd93413a8d7f07d6d8999681f27b75cffa3f

Please adjust the affected versions in the BTS as needed.

Regards,
Salvatore

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