----- Forwarded message from David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> ----- From: David Farber <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2005 09:10:32 -0400 To: Ip ip <ip@v2.listbox.com> Subject: [IP] Iraq Wireless X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.733) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Begin forwarded message: From: Dewayne Hendricks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: July 21, 2005 7:09:49 AM EDT To: Dewayne-Net Technology List <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [Dewayne-Net] Iraq Wireless Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [Note: This item comes from reader Mike Cheponis. DLH] >From: Mike Cheponis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Date: July 21, 2005 12:05:53 AM PDT >To: Dewayne Hendricks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: iraq wireless > > >WSJ excerpt: > > >`Wireless technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. >For example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can >adjust its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see >exactly where mortar shells have landed.' > > > >------ > >Iraq's Cellphone Battle Service Provider Iraqna Tries To Meet >Demand Despite Long Outages, Insurgent Use > >By YAROSLAV TROFIMOV and SARMAD ALI > >BAGHDAD, Iraq -- A video sold in Baghdad market stalls these days >shows young insurgents firing a series of mortars and calling for >the American infidels to be expelled. To adjust their aim, the >militants rely on a gadget that owes its appearance in Iraq to the >2003 U.S. invasion -- the cellphone. > >Saddam Hussein outlawed cellphones, determined to maintain an iron >grip on his subjects. But as Iraq catches up with the world's >information revolution, cellphones have become as commonplace here >as they are almost everywhere else in the world. Now, they are >increasingly being used as battle tools -- to set off bombs from >afar, to target fire and to provide insurgents with instant >communications. > >Caught in the middle of the conflict raging between the insurgents >and U.S. and Iraqi forces is the company responsible for bringing >commercial mobile-phone service to Baghdad: Iraqna. With its catchy >yellow Q emblazoned on hundreds of Baghdad storefronts, Iraqna, a >unit of Egyptian communications conglomerate Orascom Telecom >Holding SAE was supposed to be the symbol of free enterprise in a >new Iraq. But the tribulations of Iraqna (pronounced ee-RAQ-na) >since its launch in late 2003 underscore the difficulty of doing >business in a nation at war, where the freedom of wireless >communication often hits head-on the needs of security. > >Almost half of Iraqna's 300 power generators -- a necessity in >Iraqi cities, because blackouts are still a daily occurrence -- >have been stolen. Three communication sites were destroyed by >bombs. Late last year, insurgents kidnapped two Iraqna engineers, >expatriates from Egypt, and accused them of collaborating with the >U.S. Then, Iraqi security services raided Iraqna headquarters and >briefly detained the company's head of security, accusing him of >colluding with the insurgents. > >"We're between the two fires, operating in the most dangerous spot >in the world," says Shamel Hanafi, Iraqna's chief commercial >officer, who was the company's first employee on the ground here >and now co-manages the network. He sits in the company's bunker- >like office, protected against suicide bombers by concrete blast >walls and dozens of Kalashnikov-toting gunmen employed by Iraqna. >Some insurgents had accused Iraqna of helping security forces spy >on their activities -- a charge Iraqna denies, saying it >deliberately opted not to install equipment in the communications >network that would have allowed it to track and store users' >movements. > >Despite pouring more than $180 million into Iraq, making it one of >the largest private foreign investors here, Iraqna has had trouble >assuring regular service in Baghdad. Late last year and throughout >the first half of 2005 its network was plagued by frequent outages >that sometimes lasted hours or days, causing widespread resentment. >"All the Iraqis know that this is the worst provider in the whole >world. You can't contact anyone at any time," grumbles Muthanna >Anis, a vendor of cellphone accessories. > >Bombarded with complaints, Iraqna officials have pointed their >fingers in one direction: the U.S. All along, U.S. forces here have >been using jamming devices to disrupt enemy communications during >security raids and to neutralize cellphones attached to bombs that >may be waiting along the road when a convoy passes. When called, >these phones work as detonators, making the bombs explode. > >In Baghdad, fear of cellphones is so widespread that U.S. and Iraqi >security guards routinely order civilians to remove the batteries >from their phones before approaching checkpoints. Wireless >technology has made insurgent groups much more effective. For >example, a mortar-firing team miles away from its target can adjust >its aim via cellphone contact with a spotter, who can see exactly >where mortar shells have landed. > >Iraqna has 1.1 million subscribers, up from 537,000 at the end of >2004 -- the increase came after the company expanded in Iraq's >southern region, said Jonas Lindblad, a Middle East senior analyst >for Pyramid Research, a communications consulting firm in >Cambridge, Mass. When service was first offered in Iraq after the >war, subscribers paid a one-time fee of $69 and calling cards were >sold in denominations of $20 or $30. Now, starting Iraqna service >costs $17.50, and calling cards are as cheap as $10. Rates vary >from six to 12 cents per minute. > >Cellphones, despite Iraqna's problems, still often provide more >reliable communications than the fixed-line phone network, which >was badly damaged in Baghdad by American bombing and subsequent >looting in 2003. Most Iraqi cellphone users have prepaid cards that >they can continually replenish. > >U.S. military officials acknowledge that occasional jamming occurs >but deny that they systematically disrupt Iraqi communications >networks. Iraqna officials disagree, alleging that American >interference reached such massive proportions in recent months that >it frequently knocked out their entire system. > >"We understand the circumstances here, and we can accept some >interference three or four hours a day -- but not around the clock, >24 hours," says Mr. Hanafi. "The customers don't understand. They >think it's our mistake. People come here and complain, saying we >stole their money, we're crooks." > >Most U.S. officials in Baghdad, and select Iraqis, rely on a >separate, restricted cellphone network managed by MCI Inc. that >uses the 914 area code of New York's Westchester County. Another >mobile-phone competitor, Atheer Telecom, a company part-owned by >Britain's Vodafone Group PLC, has been expanding into Baghdad in >recent months, poaching clients unhappy with Iraqna's performance. > >Iraq's cellular licenses, issued when the nation was governed by >the U.S. occupation authority in 2003, divided the country into >three monopoly areas, initially restricting Iraqna to Baghdad and >central Iraq, cellphone company Asiacell to the northern part, and >Atheer to southern regions. These limits were lifted last year, >allowing competition. The three licenses expire at the end of 2005; >authorities plan a conference in London starting today to discuss >possible renewal. > >Iraqna has repeatedly taken jamming complaints to the Iraqi >government's telecommunications ministry, urging it to intercede >with the U.S. military and to confirm for irate clients that such >interference does indeed go on. Nasi Abachi, the ministry's head of >frequency management, says he and his team have responded to >several Iraqna tip-offs in recent months. > >On at least one occasion, he says, the Iraqi investigators >discovered a "clone" broadcast tower operating in central Baghdad >that falsely identified itself as part of the Iraqna network. The >result of such "intelligent jamming" was that all the phones in the >area tried to abandon the real antenna and switch to the clone, >causing a network overload and a massive disruption of service. > >Investigators have no proof that U.S. forces operated the clone >antenna, but no one else in Iraq is believed to have the technical >capability to do so. "We have good reason to believe that what >Iraqna is saying is right," Mr. Abachi says. > >Despite the problems, Iraqna is pushing ahead to gain new business. >It is targeting Iraq's southern region because it's heavily >populated, with roughly nine million people, and has a more stable >security environment than Baghdad. Like the incumbents and several >potential newcomers, Iraqna plans to compete for the new Iraq >mobile licenses. > >Plus, Iraqna's increasingly public complaints seem to have had some >effect. While jamming still occurs, it has been causing "much less >impact on the network" in recent weeks, says Iraqna's Mr. Hanafi. > > > Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as [EMAIL PROTECTED] To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org";>leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
