Erwann ABALEA <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >I've read your objections. Maybe I wasn't clear. What's wrong in installing a >cryptographic device by default on PC motherboards? I work for a PKI 'vendor', >and for me, software private keys is a nonsense.
A simple crypto device controlled by the same software is only slightly less nonsensical. That is, the difference between software-controlled keys and a device controlling the keys that does anything the software tells it to is negligible. To get any real security you need to add a trusted display, I/O system, clock, and complete crypto message-processing capability (not just "generate a signature" like the current generation of smart cards do), and that's a long way removed from what TCPA gives you. >You could obviously say that Mr Smith won't be able to move his certificates >from machine A to machine B, but more than 98% of the time, Mr Smith doesn't >need to do that. Yes he will. That is, he may not really need to do it, but he really, really wants to do it. Look at the almost-universal use of PKCS #12 to allow people to spread their keys around all over the place - any product aimed at a mass- market audience that prevents key moving is pretty much dead in the water. >Installing a TCPA chip is not a bad idea. The only effective thing a TCPA chip gives you is a built-in dongle on every PC. Whether having a ready-made dongle hardwired into every PC is a good or bad thing depends on the user (that is, the software vendor using the TCPA device, not the PC user). Peter.
