Get Me
Rewrite"
Rumsfeld vs. the
Generals
By JASON
LEOPOLD
Last
October, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld ordered the military's
regional commanders to rewrite all of their war plans to capitalize on
precision weapons, better intelligence and speedier deployment in the
event the United States decided to invade Iraq. That plan, which Rumsfeld
helped shape, has now failed and has led to deep divisions between
military commanders and the defense, according to recent news reports.
Despite Rumsfeld's recent denials that he did not override requests by
military brass to deploy more ground troops in Iraq last year, the
cornerstone of his war plan against Iraq was in fact designed to use
fewer ground troops, according to a copy of the plan; a move that angered
some in the military who said concern for the troops would require
overwhelming superiority on the ground to assure victory.
These officers said they view Rumsfeld's approach as injecting too much
risk into war planning and have said it could result in U.S. casualties
that might be prevented by amassing larger forces.
But Rumsfeld refused to listen to his military commanders, Pentagon
officials told the Washington Post Saturday.
Rumsfeld was quoted in news reports last year as saying that his plan
would allow "the military to begin combat operations on less notice
and with far fewer troops than thought possible -- or thought wise --
before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks."
"Looking at what was overwhelming force a decade or two decades ago,
today you can have overwhelming force, conceivably, with lesser numbers
because the lethality is equal to or greater than before" Rumsfeld
said.
The speedier use of smaller and more agile forces also could provide the
president with time to order an offensive against Iraq that could be
carried out this winter, the optimal season for combat in the desert,
which is exactly what President Bush did.
The new approach for how the U.S. might go to war, Rumsfeld said last
year, reflects an assessment of the need after Sept. 11 to refresh war
plans continuously and to respond faster to threats from terrorists and
nations possessing biological, chemical or nuclear weapons.
Rumsfeld first laid the groundwork for a U.S. led invasion of Iraq
shortly after the Sept. 11. Like his well-known,
"Rumsfeld's
rules,"--a collection of wisdom he
has compiled over three decades on how to succeed in Washington,
Rumsfeld's checklist used the same methodical approach to determining
when U.S. military force should be used in the event of war against
Iraq.
Rumsfeld kept the checklist tucked away in his desk drawer at the
Pentagon. Since last March, when it became clear that the Bush
administration was leaning toward using military force to overthrow
Saddam Hussein's regime, Rumsfeld added what he said were important
elements to the checklist to ensure the U.S. would be prepared for a
full-scale war. But Rumsfeld and the Bush administration never lived up
to the promises laid out in the checklist when the U.S. military bombed
Baghdad. For example:
Casualties. Rumsfeld says the public "should not be allowed to
believe an engagement could be executed . . . with few casualties."
Yet the president and Rumsfeld didn't prepare Americans for major
casualties. Bush warned in an Oct. 7 speech in Cincinnati that
"military action could be difficult" and that there is no
"easy or risk-free course of action."
* Risks. Rumsfeld warns that the risks of taking action "must be
carefully considered" along with the dangers of doing nothing. The
administration has repeatedly made the case against inaction -- the
possibility that Saddam will acquire nuclear weapons and strike the U.S.
But it has not been equally candid about the dangers of action.
* Honesty. Rumsfeld urges U.S. leadership to be "brutally honest
with itself, Congress, the public and coalition partners." Yet the
administration has not produced compelling evidence to support its claims
that Saddam is linked to al-Qaeda terrorists, is on the verge of
acquiring nuclear weapons or intends to strike the U.S. To the contrary,
the CIA has played down Iraq's ties to al-Qaeda and a possible first
strike.
Rumsfeld said too many of the military plans on the shelves of the
regional war-fighting commanders contained outdated assumptions and
military requirements, which have since changed with the advent of new
weapons and doctrines.
It has been a mistake, he said, to measure the quantity of forces
required for a mission and "fail to look at lethality, where you end
up with precision-guided munitions, which can give you 10 times the
lethality that a dumb weapon might, as an example," Rumsfeld said,
according to an Oct 14, 2002 report in the New York Times.
Through a combination of pre-deployments, faster cargo ships and a larger
fleet of transport aircraft, the military would be able to deliver
"fewer troops but in a faster time that would allow you to have
concentrated power that would have the same effect as waiting longer with
what a bigger force might have" Rumsfeld said.
Critics in the military said last year there were several reasons to
deploy a force of overwhelming numbers before starting any offensive with
Iraq. Large numbers illustrate U.S. resolve and can intimidate Iraqi
forces into laying down their arms or even turning against Hussein's
government.
Large numbers in the region also would be needed should the initial
offensive go poorly.. Also, once victory is near, it might require an
even larger force to pacify Iraq and search for weapons of mass
destruction than it took to topple Hussein.
According to Defense Department sources, Rumsfeld at first insisted that
vast air superiority and a degraded Iraqi military would enable 75,000
U.S. troops to win the war. Gen. Tommy Franks, the theater
commander-in-chief, convinced Rumsfeld to send 250,000 (augmented by
45,000 British). However, the Army would have preferred a much deeper
force, leading to anxiety inside the Pentagon in the first week of war,
conservative columnist Bob Novak reported last week.
While Army officers would have preferred a larger commitment, even what
was finally approved for Operation Iraqi Freedom was reduced when the 4th
Infantry Division was denied Turkey as a base to invade northern Iraq.
The Defense and State departments point fingers. Secretary of State Colin
Powell is criticized for not flying to Ankara to convince the Turkish
government. The Pentagon is criticized for not immediately dispatching
the division via the Red Sea, Novak reported.
To the critics who said last year that Rumsfeld is accepting too much
risk in U.S. war planning, Rumsfeld said he had ordered rigorous reviews
and was satisfied. "We are prepared for the worst case," he
told the Times.
Jason Leopold can be reached at:
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
