Donald Rumsfeld lied Friday (March 28) when a reporter asked if the US was
misleading the public about its casualties in Iraq.
Rumsfeld feigned indignation. Looking straight into the camera, he said
something like: "That's a terrible thing to suggest. We always tell the truth."
It is unacceptable to lie to excuse poor judgement
April 2 2003
By Andy Butfoy
Is government credibility a condition for continuing public support for a
tougher than expected war? If so, trouble may be looming for the Howard
Government, because it has either endorsed or acquiesced in a series of
deceptions, half-truths, and delusions to drag us into Iraq.
First, suggestions that invading Iraq was pivotal to the struggle against
al-Qaeda were suspect. Evidence for the al-Qaeda link never convinced
objective observers. Nevertheless, the idea transformed Iraq from a serious
international diplomatic issue into a supposed vital national security
challenge for the US and, via the alliance, for Australia, too.
If the link now develops, it might be as the result of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. After all, resistance to coalition attacks provides a potential
convergence of interests between Iraqi/Arab nationalism and violent Islamic
fundamentalism.
Second, assertions the build-up to war was driven by a wish to reinforce
the UN and international law were, for key American players in this story,
mostly a propaganda ploy. Regime change was always the main game. UN cover
was handy for a while, but eventually the absurdity of the US stance became
transparent.
During the slide from peace to war there were two episodes that exposed the
dodgy character of the legal and internationalist case for invasion.
There were those strident demands from Washington for UN Security Council
members to declare their hand in a vote for war; but when it was known the
invasion wouldn't be endorsed, the vote was called off. Then we saw UN
inspectors being asked to leave to pave the way for US pre-emption.
Third, claims Australia had maintained its strategic independence from the
war policy devised by the US in the months leading to the invasion were
implausible.
Fourth, representations of the shock and awe strategy fudged the line
between mistake and deception.
The strategy was supposed to overwhelm the Iraq regime quickly.
However, when it arrived, shock and awe looked shocking and awful,
especially to those who doubted the legitimacy of the war. So the tune was
changed: media briefings repackaged the bombing of Baghdad as a big
fireworks display intended more to impress than to kill.
Today, as the most optimistic predictions evaporate, more adjustment seems
to be occurring. The destructiveness of coalition firepower has apparently
been escalated as a form of compensation for both past disappointments and
miscalculation over Iraqi tactics, and as a more traditional way of
smashing Iraqi resistance. This is undermining an important part of the
salesmanship of shock and awe: that unintended consequences would be limited.
Fifth, psychological warfare directed against the Iraqi regime became
indistinguishable from an exercise to mislead Western public opinion. This
seems to account partly for the prewar optimism and the false information
spread during the opening days of the conflict. To a degree, this was
understandable and sensible; if a few fibs could speed up victory and save
lives, so be it. But it becomes unacceptable to lie in order to excuse poor
judgement, protect domestic political positions, or rationalise escalation.
A possible sixth point concerns claims the invasion will help to transform
the Middle East into a haven of democracy. Perhaps this should be kept off
the list because it is a particularly US notion and can't yet be properly
assessed, although it does seem a recklessly optimistic basis for starting
a war.
Obviously, the points outlined above don't apply equally to all who
advocated invasion. But as a package of ideas they had a key role in
framing the case for attacking Iraq. The possible discovery of weapons of
mass destruction might help apologists for war feel better, but it will not
remove questions about the integrity, credibility, and legitimacy of the
process which led to the invasion.
Andy Butfoy is a senior lecturer in international relations at Monash
University
http://theage.com.au/articles/2003/04/01/1048962759725.html
