> > And how will a regular consumer, with no math degree, verify that > > her coins are indeed partially blinded ? Trust the bank ? No shit. > > The regular consumer will rely on a third party to examine the source > to see that they securely and correctly implement the protocols to > assure privacy.
That doesn't work in meatspace. Take a look at much (mathematically) simpler situations of so-called consumer PCs attached to the so-called Internet. Consumer are clueless about war that goes on on "their" hardware between corps and governments that want the control of that piece of equipment. But it's mostly OK since nothing really serious is done with PCs - some e-mails, some shopping. Yet many people are already wary of computers, and we are not talking luddites here. Using a piece of hardware with invisible transistors and uncomprehensible firmware to store money doesn't seem likely at all. Real cash has advantage that it does not need mediation of experts and expert-built machinery for practical verification and use. It is itself in human-readable form. While it is true that said experts try to insert their products in everyday life to secure the regular income, prostituting their professions, it is unlikely that it will be success when cash is the object. More people that I know store gold today than ten years ago. General disenchantment with computing machinery is obvious to all except those blinded by their vested interests. If you want to find the real state of computer-consumer economy njust look at the parking lot in front of Fry's. No, it's not a helidrome, it used to be for cars. To succeed in this situation the idea, or product, that modifies some very old concepts has to be really good and sane. The e-checks, as discussed here, fail to impress even "experts", and don't count that sheeple will be *that* dumb. > In the smart card setting with Brands protocols there is a host > computer (eg pda, laptop, mobile-phone main processor, desktop) and a > tamper-resistant smart-card which computes part of the coin transfer > and prevents double-spending (to the limit of it's tamper-resistance). I don't understand which problem are you trying to solve. Apart for few cypherpunks, People With Real Money and mafia, all of whom already have all the anonymity they want, sheeple is handled by corporations whose income depends on non-anonymity. I don't see a market pressure for anon replacement for credit cards from the consumer side any more that I see pressure for IPSec'd traffic from Joe FivePack. > It may seem convoluted, but by comparison assurance of security of > algorithms used with credit-cards over SSL, or even the authentication > framework used by card swipe credit cards also would appear The difference here is that large and capable entities - banks - stand to lose if something goes wrong, and they handle the whole system. Privacy and anonymity, on the other hand, is personal and no one is on your side. You have to have all resources. Assuming that the bank will expend resources to protect YOUR anonymity when you don't have any practical means of verifying it is silly. > For acceptance of privacy features similar issues will hold. Do the > privacy advocates, analysts, and experts agree that the system > provides privacy. I, for one, will try to avoid situations where advocates of any kind can influence the amount and security of my cash. ===== end (of original message) Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows: Yahoo! Tax Center - online filing with TurboTax http://taxes.yahoo.com/
