You forgot:
* Add a keyword to the subject line.
This has several good properties.
1. Easily implemented in all mailers. Many users, for good or
bad reasons, have to work with incompetant mailers which
prevent PGP encryption, adding X-Header lines, etc.
2. Automatically carries over into replies.
3. Nearly all mail readers allow filtering on keywords in the
subject line.
Thus, filtering can be performed at both the level of the
individual
reader, or at the CDR node.
4. Placed at the end of the subject line, it preserves lexical
sorts.
5. Does not require a poster to be subscribed.
6. Works fine through anonymizers, remailers, ZKS, etc.
7. It's a proven technique, borrowed from Usenet.
It also has two bad properties::
1. It is butt-ugly.
2. Some regular list posters may refuse to use it, so you'd have
to check the non-keyworded messages anyway (or set up
special filtering inclusion rules for them).
Peter Trei
PS: Quite honestly, while the current level of spam is annoying, I filter
it by hand pretty fast - once I realized that anything from 'sparklist'
was garbage, the rest of its messages got deleted unread in a few seconds.
pt
> ----------
> From: David Marshall[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Reply To: David Marshall
> Sent: Tuesday, July 11, 2000 4:18 PM
> To: Multiple recipients of list
> Subject: Re: Fw: "Survivability of a minarchist society"
>
> Options and their problems:
>
> * Requiring mail be encrypted to a list key. The CDR nodes decrypt it
> and send it out unencrypted. This will totally eliminate the kinds
> of attacks we've been experiencing. Unfortunately, poor integration
> of PGP with mailers causes problems.
> * Allow only postings from addresses subscribed to any one of the CDR
> nodes, and from remailers. Some people have a problem with this. It
> would involve keeping a master list of subscribed addresses and
> permissible unsubscribed (i.e. remailer) addresses. Requires coding,
> and some people don't like it.
> * Require PGP signing of messages to the list. This presents the same
> problem as requiring that mail to the list be encrypted to the CDR
> network, and presents a big problem with anonymity and plausible
> deniability at the same time.
> * Reject mail from [EMAIL PROTECTED] This will eliminate some of
> the problem, but only temporarily. Attackers will start spamming
> other CDRs. People signing up for validation on lame-ass web sites
> like the New York Times site will just use another list address. It
> will, however, alleviate some of the "Do you want a home business?"
> bullshit.
>
>
>