HI STEVE -------- Original Message -------- On Aug 27, 2019, 12:32 PM, Stephen D. Williams wrote:
> On 8/24/19 11:33 PM, Zenaan Harkness wrote: > >> On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 11:34:53PM -0700, Stephen D. Williams wrote: >> >>> For certain common purposes, one would not want anonymity, but pseudonymity >>> along with certain pairs and groups having true name sharing or reputational >>> pseudonyms, federated identities, etc. >>> >>> Messages should have verifiable provenance, protection, and sometimes known >>> chain of evidence. >>> >>> There should be methods to determine leakers, and similar bad actors. >> >> HA! >> >> SDW-Fed pops up again. >> >> > There should be methods to determine leakers, and similar bad >> > actors. >> >> Absolutely precious! >> >> Parody, irony, subterfuge attempt, or plain ole Jewish Chutzpah - >> whatever in hell your smokin', there ain't no freedom in it... >> >> Chuckle of the day dept. > > I generally don't have time to waste with you puerile idiots who imagine that > they are bullying people in any meaningful way toward any useful goal at all. > But one message before you two are plonked again. > > If you two didn't think so shallowly and stupidly, you would see that > features like "methods to determine leakers, and similar bad actors" are > useful for groups fearful of illegal or otherwise improper overstep by groups > like the FBI, such as by an undercover mole or false flag agent or similar. > So, as per usual, you completely misunderstood the implications, arriving at > an exactly opposite misunderstanding. Typical. > > You have inspired an additional feature: Training on a corpus of your > rantings to auto-filter certain people from all future systems and > communication as being the chronic bad actors you are. That would be useful > here on the now long-polluted Cypherpunks. The consistency of your insane > paranoia and verbal diarrhea certainly means that you are trivial for the > authorities to track through any group communication system. > > The FBI had a rocky, messy genesis. And for too long they did things we now > solidly think of as improper and wrong. They still have made some bad > mistakes not that long ago. There are some misguided laws that they are in > charge of prosecuting. However, they are pretty much all good people trying > to do the right thing in all circumstances. If you actually did anything > useful in life, had a real job, a real company, or a real family, or if you > cared about others at all, there are plenty of circumstances where you would > want the FBI around to help. That doesn't mean that we, as citizens, > shouldn't expect excellence, oversight, and strict avoidance of abuse and > especially lack of accountability of abuse. And we should protect our rights > in a way that doesn't enable terrorists etc. too much. > > At the same time, we should try to find solutions to problems like, as I call > it, the Indian Village Whatsapp Rumor Killings - what happens when unfettered > encrypted messaging meets impressionable people with not much understanding > of the perils of losing provenance & verification along with the asymmetry of > sensationalist information flow, and how do we fix it without allowing other > problems? > > We do have a solution that mostly works: Centralized unencrypted messaging > hubs like Facebook, Twitter, et al that can be monitored, data mined, > correlated, shared with authorities, etc. It's a bummer if that is the only > workable solution. With enough rules, that can continue to work most of the > time, but it's not optimal. Too bad this channel is so polluted, by you, > that we couldn't work on an alternate solution. We used to solve problems > here. > > Solving this properly will involve some balance of crypto, technology, > policy, ethics, law, sociology, psychology, and economics. If you can't > understand how things are currently working, you're probably not capable of > designing a better alternative. If you think that the FBI / Google / Amazon > / Facebook / Apple are only bad, or are actively trying to spy on you for > immoral & illegitimate purposes, etc., that's probably not a good sign of > your capability or mental health. There is a difference between 'this is > possible' and 'this multi-billion dollar company would assume they could get > away with ______ without any leaks, clearly risking those billions'. Good to > examine and battle over the gray areas, where they do sometimes go too far. > But many are illogically paranoid. A professional level of security > awareness and understanding takes all of that into account, avoiding paranoia. > > sdw > >>> It should be possible to limit DDoS and similar abuse that tries to disable >>> the network; hard to do if everything is anonymous. >>> >>> Perhaps this could be layered on to bitmessage or a similar but different >>> system. >>> >>> Stephen >>> >>> On 8/23/19 12:22 PM, Steven Schear wrote: >>> >>>> The lead developer is Peter Surda. >>>> >>>> On Fri, Aug 23, 2019, 5:07 AM Zenaan Harkness < >>>> [email protected] >>>> >>>> [<mailto:[email protected]>](mailto:[email protected]) >>>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 09:29:52PM -0000, >>>> [email protected] >>>> >>>> [<mailto:[email protected]>](mailto:[email protected]) >>>> wrote: >>>> > Bitmessage - Anonymous, Encrypted, Secure Messaging, Chans, and >>>> Broadcasts >>>> > >>>> -------------------------------------------------------------------------- >>>> > >>>> > There is a uncensorable messaging and discussion network, >>>> Bitmessage. It >>>> > is a decentralized and trustless peer-to-peer protocol. It sports a >>>> slick >>>> > graphical interface that works like a mail client. The UX is snappy >>>> and >>>> > easy even for Grandma. Management of cryptography keys and signing is >>>> > automatic under the hood and is never exposed to the end user. It is >>>> an >>>> > order of magnitude easier to use than PGP or GnuPG. >>>> > >>>> > >>>> https://bitmessage.org >>>>> >>>> https://github.com/Bitmessage/PyBitmessage >>>>> >>>> > Bitmessage works like the old mixnets or remailers but much more >>>> securely. >>>> > It is highly resistant to eavesdropping and censorship. The lead >>>> developer >>>> > is from the old cypherpunk culture. >>>> > >>>> > Bitmessage has several useful features: >>>> > >>>> > * Connect via Tor >>>> > * Anonymous chans >>>> > * Anonymous broadcasts >>>> > * Anonymous distributed mailing list repeaters >>>> > * Private messaging addresses >>>> > * Automatic management of all cryptography keys >>>> > >>>> > You can run bitmessage in a firejail on Linux for extra extra >>>> security. >>>> > We've found only one security hole in over six years of development, >>>> and >>>> > we're pretty confident that it is very secure "out of the box" at >>>> this >>>> > time. >>>> > >>>> > If you want to help the network please configure a node to accept >>>> incoming >>>> > connections to increase the speed and security of the network against >>>> > traffic analysis. The more peers that accept incoming connections >>>> the more >>>> > resilient the network becomes. >>>> > >>>> > Please share this resource with all the mailing lists to which you >>>> are >>>> > subscribed, with your friends, and on bulletin boards. >>>> > >>>> > I hope to see you on the Bitmessage channel, [chan] cypherpunks. >>>> > >>>> > To subscribe to this chan in Bitmessage, click on the 'Chans' tab, >>>> then >>>> > click the 'Add chan' button, then enter the passphrase 'cypherpunks' >>>> and >>>> > click OK. >>>> > >>>> > The crypto community has been hijacked by shills who try to control >>>> the >>>> > discussion and keep people in the dark about the sad state of >>>> privacy. >>>> > There are a lot of pro-law-enforcement shills who are trying to move >>>> us >>>> > into back-doored crypto. The "leaders" have hidden agendas. They keep >>>> > rolling out broken cryptography full of security holes (how >>>> convenient), >>>> > then tell the rest of us to never roll our own crypto (how >>>> inconvenient >>>> > for them), that we should put all our eggs in their leaky basket. >>>> > >>>> > a old cypherpunk >>>> >>>> On the face of the above marketing, checking all the right boxes - >>>> that's a good start. >>>> >>>> Needs to be at the top of a few bucket lists to review the >>>> architecture, compare, etc. >>>> >>>> Thank you for the heads up... >>> >>> --
