Jim Choate writes: > Bull, the hardware companies aren't any more trustworthy. True. You can always validate a few from a batch by plasma etching the device, and trace the structures on an electromicrograph (some EMs allow you to observe the device in operation). Also, it is hard to insert a trapdoor into an FPGA. OpenSource hardware.
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