Arnold's summary of Clinton's statement is correct, but it seems as though
the law differentiates between *crypto-encounters* and
*unbreakable-crypto-encounters*. From the text of the enrolled (final)
version of the bill:
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d106:s.01769:
(a) Section 2519(2)(b) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by
striking `and (iv)' and inserting `(iv) the number of orders in which
encryption was encountered and whether such encryption prevented law
enforcement from obtaining the plain text of communications intercepted
pursuant to such order, and (v)'.
I hope that means the Justice Department and the administrative office of
the US courts will break down those numbers into two seperate columns in
the annual reports.
-Declan
At 08:58 5/5/2000 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
>It's worse than that. The new reports are to cover "law enforcement
>encounters with encrypted communications in the execution of wiretap
>orders." http://www.politechbot.com/docs/clinton-crypto.050300.html
>"Encounters" suggests that there will be no distinction between encryption
>that hinders law enforcement access and encryption that does not. For
>example, any tap of a GSM cell phone could be reported even though the
>cipher GSM uses is relatively easy to break. In 1999 there were 676
>authorized taps for cell phones and pagers vs. 399 for stationary phones.
>(1998: 576 vs 494, so the trend is toward cell phones)
>
>They might even count code-division multiplexing as encryption. That
>could sweep in many cordless phones used on the stationary lines as well.
>Expect reports that imply encryption is a huge problem for wire taps.
>
>Arnold Reinhold
