Ellison & Schneier point out in their PKI paper that 
to verify a person, you need shared information 
which isn't public --unlike most of 
the data the credit companies keep.   Your mother's
maiden name really doesn't cut it any more.

This is right on the mark.

In conversation where natural voice biometrics 
aren't used (e.g., email) you can verify 
that a person is who they claim 
by using shared meatspace history 
as your shared secret.  "Hey, remember that
time..."

But many people document their lives 
on line; the blooming of narcissism 
or expression, take your pick.  Imagine 
spoofing an identity by using inferences 
made from say, their Burning Man (tm) or family
online photos and stories or images autoretrieved
from the zillions of public-area webcams coming
soon to an area near you.   "Yeah, my Joe Jr. went
to 2nd grade with your Jane in '98.. are her braces off yet?"

(Of course, if a mutant spoofs a normal, this
self-documentation could be self-protective 
disinformation; info-mimicry.  It would act as a 'honeypot'
to catch the casual faux-familiar.)









  




Reply via email to