scottconstable wrote: This PR is intended to improve security for X86 kernels, as the title suggests. I think that we can and should incorporate feedback from the other participants, several of whom have recommended that this new behavior should be explicitly enabled with a flag, rather than implicitly enabled by examining the target triple. So, for example, I could update the PR to introduce a new flag such as `-fsanitize-cfi-icall-experimental-arity-x86`. If the community would like to adopt a similar approach that is tuned to benefit Arm64 kernels, then that approach could be enabled with a different flag.
Flag-based enabling would also help to address the concerns about compiler compatibility. For instance, if an x86 kernel is being built with both C and Rust code, then Kconfig could check whether the local clang and rustc compilers support the KCFI arity enhancement; if one or the other does not support KCFI arity then Kconfig would fall back to the default 32-bit hash. @rcvalle I don't see any evidence that this approach will require a plethora of implementations for different arch/ABI combinations. As far as I am aware, the vast majority of x86-64 Linux kernel code (including eBPF code) uses the standard ABI. Even if some kernel code does not conform to the standard ABI, this should not break compatibility with the arity enhancement because the arity enhancement's implementation derives the arity tag from the function type, not from the ABI. Hence, a valid function call that uses a non-standard ABI would still experience a matching KCFI type ID at both the call site and the call target. The downside is that call sites/targets with a non-standard ABI might be tagged with an inaccurate arity, which could matter if the function type's 29-bit hash collides with another function type's 29-bit hash, and that other function's arity tag is the same but the two functions' actual arities differ. IMO this seems very unlikely. https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/117121 _______________________________________________ cfe-commits mailing list cfe-commits@lists.llvm.org https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cfe-commits
