haoNoQ wrote: > I've just left here what my thought process was when I dig into a similar > case. It might be useful, who knows.
Medium-to-long-term I think an attribute-based approach might make sense there: - Either annotate reference-counting pointers as "hey I'm a smart pointer (I'm following a different safety model in which symbolic execution based analysis would do more harm than good) so please ignore memory managed by me"; - Or annotate reference-counted objects (i.e. objects that contain an intrusive reference count and are always managed by intrusive reference-counted pointers) with an attribute "hey I'm always well-managed, please ignore my allocations entirely (for the same reason)". Or both. I've definitely seen a few codebases, that are security-critical to a large-ish chunk of humanity, that have like 20 competing ad-hoc reference-counting schemes. Mostly in plain C where MallocChecker would otherwise be very useful, if it wasn't ruined by false positives of a similar nature from all these reference counting schemes. These schemes probably don't make sense to hardcode in the compiler because there's no inheritance so you'd need to hardcode every struct that follows one of those schemes, not just every scheme in and of itself. > I considered modeling the atomic member functions, until the first place they > escape, after which we can no longer ever reason about them. This made me to > look into suppressions. Yeah I think it's not sufficient to model the atomics. It's a good idea to model them anyway, but even when atomics aren't used (eg. the custom smart pointer never needed to be thread-safe), the fundamental problem is that we still don't know the *initial* value of the reference count. In particular we can't refute the possibility that the original value was like `-1` or something. Modeling atomics would make it better when the smart pointer was first created *during* analysis, so we actually know that the initial value is 0. Then by carefully tracking it we might arrive to the correct conclusion. But when the initial value is symbolic we're fundamentally powerless without the domain-specific knowledge that the value could not have been `-1`. It's possible that this domain-specific knowledge could be transferred to us with the help of well-placed assertions across the smart pointer class. But an attribute could achieve the same in a more direct manner. > I believe, that such a heuristic with dominators could work for the rest of > the checkers - where the bug report is attached to some given statement - and > not delayed until some other future statement like in the leak checker. Yes, I think there has to be something good in this area, even though I haven't got any good specific solutions in my head. @Szelethus did a lot of initial experimentation in this area, which resulted in improved condition tracking, but we haven't used it for false positive suppression yet. Once we research this deeper and make it more principled, maybe we should really start doing that. It may also be a good idea to not look at the bug report in isolation, but consider the entire space of execution paths on which it was found. If the space isn't "vast" enough to convince us that we aren't stepping onto an #61669, suppress the warning. https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/90918 _______________________________________________ cfe-commits mailing list cfe-commits@lists.llvm.org https://lists.llvm.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/cfe-commits
